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WHERE DOES THE BEACH BEGIN, AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IS THIS A FEDERAL QUESTION
CHARLES E. CORKER*

In Hughes v. State, the Washington Supreme Court decided that
the boundary between upland and tideland is the vegetation line
as it existed in 1889. Its decision conflicts with an earlier decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which followed the
United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v.
Borax Consol., Ltd. The decisions conflict both on criteria for
locating the boundary and on its fixed or movable character. Underlying both questions are fundamental issues about the extent
to which state or federal law provides the answers. After extensive
analysis of these answers, Professor Corker concludes that unless
the United States Supreme Court grants certiorariin Hughes, the
confusion which has long characterized this field will continue.
Professor Corker analyzes both the substantive and jurisdictional
issues. While sharply critical of the Washington Supreme Court's
techniques of decision, he argues that state law, either directly
or as incorporated in federal law, must influence the ultimate decision if just and workable boundary rules are to result. His
conclusion requires modification or rejection of the Borax decision,
which he asserts even the United States Bureau of Land Management has honored by a policy of conscious forgetfulness.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Washington in January 1966 answered both

questions in our caption in a suit brought by Mrs. Stella Hughes to
quiet her title to ocean front property on Washington's Long Beach

Peninsula.' She had sued the state, which owns the beach2 fronting her
IHughes

v. State, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 787, 410 P.2d 20 (1966) (7-2 decision).
The Washington Attorney General reported to the court that at the time of trial
ten adjacent property owners had commenced suits against the state. Seven of these
suits by formal stipulaton and three by verbal stipulation were to be concluded by
the ultimate decision in Hughes. Brief for Appellant, p. 11.
'We wanted to use "beach" in our caption because this article relates to a
decision of the Washington Supreme Court concerning the boundary of what everyone can agree is a beach. We were happy to find authority for doing so. ANGELL,
TIDE WATERS 67 (2d ed. 1847), tells us that "shore," "strand," and "beach" are proper
to designate "that space of land which is alternately covered and left dry, by the
rising and falling of the tide. In other words, it is the space which is betveen the
high and low-water marks."
The definitional problem is sensitive. Angell tells us that the 13th Chapter of
St. Matthew inappropriately describes Jesus as addressing a multitude on the shore.
Because it was a lake, without tides, "it could not properly be said to have a 'shore,'
according to our legal understanding of that term; it has "ripam;'but not 'litus.'"
Angell's closer target from "quaint times" was CALlIS, READING ON THE STATUTF OF
SEWERs 54 (2d ed. 1685). Callis had inappropriately quoted St. Matthew for the
definition of "shore."
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property, and had secured a judgment from the trial court determining
that (1) the boundary of her upland property is the line of mean high
tide established by the average of all high tides over an 18.6 year tidal
cycle, and (2) her property includes all the land added by gradual
processes of accretion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had so held in 1961 in a suit brought by the United States for the
benefit of the heirs of Samson Johns, a Quinault Indian to whom the
United States had patented the land after statehood, by trust patent
with trust restrictions to expire in 1960.
The Washington Supreme Court's answers were bad news to Mrs.
Hughes. Reversing the judgment of the trial court, it told her in
effect: Your property line is 561 feet- more than one-tenth of a
mile-inland from where it would be if you were a Quinault Indian
holding under a trust patent from the United States. The answer is not
affected at all by the fact that original title to your land is also a patent
from the United States, or that it was issued to your predecessor prior
to statehood. Your boundary is not the line established by the average
of all high tides; it is the line of vegetation. Furthermore, since the
state owns all accretions added to the upland since 1889 when Washington became a state, your boundary is the vegetation line as it existed
seventy-seven years ago. That is the way we read the Washington
Constitution, of which this court, not the Supreme Court of the United
States, is the ultimate interpreter.
On October 10, 1966, after receiving a petition for certiorari from
Mrs. Hughes and opposition from the Washington Attorney General,
the Supreme Court, without acting on the petition for certiorari, entered this order: "The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief expressing the views of the United States."4
In 1961 the Court of Appeals gave quite different answers to the
questions in our caption when it decided the Samson Johns case,' in
'United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 817 (1962). This case will hereinafter be referred to in text and textual footnotes as Samson Johns.
'87 Sup. Ct. 82 (1966).
'United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 817 (1962). The Samson Johns litigation was initiated by complaint filed by
the United States in 1951. Three opinions are reported [hereinafter identified in
footnotes by report and page number] :
(1) United States v. Gas & Oil Dev. Co., 126 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
Judge George H. Boldt dismissed the complaint on the ground that the United
States had no standing to sue because its earlier fee patent to Samson Johns made
ineffective the cancellation of that patent and substitution of a trust patent. By what
he recognized as dictum, he upheld the state's position on the merits, but discussed
only the moving boundary and not the vegetation line issue.
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which the United States was treated as owner of the upland patented
in trust to Samson Johns. The United States District Court had
determined the boundary between federally held upland and the state's
tideland by applying Washington law, and had accurately anticipated
the Hughes decision in determining what that law might be.' The
court of appeals reversed, holding that Washington law is irrelevant.
Following Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles,' in which the
upland owner derived title from a patent granted by the United States
after statehood, the court of appeals held that federal law dictates (1)
(2) United States v. Washington, 233 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1956). The Court of
Appeals reversed Judge Boldt's decision in an opinion which did not reach the
merits.
(3) United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961). This opinion
reversed a second decision by Judge Boldt in which no opinion was published. By
stipulation the case had been submitted on the evidence in the first trial heard by a
master.
' On second trial, the district judge's first conclusion of law was that accretion
since November 11, 1889, belonged to the state; his second conclusion was that accretion prior to that date belonged to the United States. His conclusion III was:
The dividing line between the accretions forming subsequent to November 11,
1889, which belong to defendant, State of Washington, and those which had
formed prior thereto is the line of ordinary high tide to the Pacific Ocean defined as that line which the covering water impressed on the soil as of that date
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of vegetation and destroy
its value for agricultural purposes.
The judge's fourth and final conclusion of law: "A rule of property has been
established in the State of Washington in accordance with these conclusions of law."
Transcript of Record in Court of Appeal, pp. 50-51, 294 F.2d 830. The judgment
entered recited the quoted language from Conclusion of Law III, but did not purport
to describe the boundary thus established.
By contrast, the decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Hughes defines by
legal description the line which the district judge had described only by formula.
The mystery which we shall attempt to open up, but unfortunately cannot resolve,
is how the verbal formula is converted to a legal description.
7296 U.S. 10 (1935).
This case will hereinafter be referred to in text and textual
footnotes as Borax.
Five opinions are reported in the Borax litigation [hereinafter identified in
footnotes by report and page number] :
(1) City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 5 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Cal. 1933).
Suit was brought by Los Angeles to quiet title to portions of Mormon Island
claimed as tideland, which defendant claimed as upland under patent from the
United States incorporating a federal survey. The court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the patent incorporating the survey line as
boundary was a determination of the federal land department not subject to
collateral attack.
(2) City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 74 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1935).
Reversed district court's dismissal of the complaint on ground that the survey
referred to in the patent established meander lines, which are not determinative of boundary. Directed that district court should determine location of
mean high tide line as defined by Coast and Geodetic Survey.
(3) Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). Affirmed circuit
court's reversal of district court and direction to establish boundary according
to Coast and Geodetic Survey.
(4) City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 20 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
City held estopped, under state law, by dealings with Borax Company.
(5) City of Los Angeles v. Borax onsol. Ltd., 102 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 644 (1939). Affirmed decree of district court on the ground of estoppel.

19661

WHERE DOES THE BEACH BEGIN

that the upland-tideland boundary is the line of mean high tide, as
defined by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, not the
vegetation line, and (2) that all accretions (an issue not involved in
Borax) belong to the upland patentee or his assigns.
The two decisions represent the irresistible force colliding with the
immovable object. They cannot coexist unless-in what we would
regard as less than the happiest of all possible outcomes-Samson
Johns is restated to rest on the ground that the United States was the
owner rather than the source of title.
The Hughes case is important. It is important to the people of
Washington for whom the beach is a prime public resource. It is important to all who own land on the beach, whether it is upland patented
by the United States or tideland bought from the state.8 It is important
to those who own land-upland or shore land--on inland navigable
waters, because the Washington court came close to overruling its
decision of twenty years ago that upland boundaries on navigable
inland rivers move by accretion. It is important to the people in
every jurisdiction in the United States because it raises the question
whether the issues are to be decided under state law by state courts, or
are to be decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. Finally,
Hughes is important in Washington because the supreme court took
its construction of the Washington Constitution primarily from a "rule
of property" created by a series of unreported superior court decisions
contrary to and in disregard of the law earlier declared by the Washington Supreme Court. There may be a lot more law yet to come from
that unexplored, and relatively unexplorable, source.
As the Washington Supreme Court saw its task, the problem was
simple. The property line between the upland and the beach may be
found by construing the words "the line of ordinary high tide" in
article XVII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution, a provision
unamended since Washington became a state in 1889:10
DECLARATION OF STATE OWNERSHIP.
The state of
Vashington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable
waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in
waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line
Owners of tide and shore lands purchased from the state are equally affected by
the decision, if they are not also owners of the adjoining upland. However, in
Pacific County where the Hughes case arose, tidelands have not been for sale since
1901, and accretion lands have never been authorized by the legislature for sale. See
note 198 infra and accompanying text.
0
Ghione v. State, 26 Wn. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
"0First emphasis added.
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of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes:
Provided, that this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state.
The Washington court, on its own premises, started with one large
advantage. It had identified words in an identified document to construe." The federal courts had neither. However, neither the Washington Constitution nor the law applied in Borax and Samson Johns
was written on a clean slate. The foundations of the common legal
problem are the judicial creation of the United States Supreme Court

more than 100 years ago.
In 1845, the United States Supreme Court decided, in Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan," that the states either own or may by their laws
determine ownership of lands underlying navigable waters. 3 This is
an attribute of sovereignty in which the original states are successors to
the British Crown. Later states are entitled to equal footing. 4 A
n The distinction between interpretation and construction, more often ignored
than recognized, is proposed by 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 534, at 9 (1961) :
By 'interpretation of language' we determine what ideas that language induces
in other persons. By 'construction of the contract,' as that term will be used
here, we determine its legal operation-its effect upon the action of courts and
administrative officials. If we make this distinction, then the construction of a
contract starts with the interpretation of its language but does not end with it;
while the process of interpretation stops wholly short of a determination of the
legal relations of the parties. When a court gives a construction to the contract
as that is affected by events subsequent to its making and not foreseen by the
parties, it is departing very far from mere interpretation of their symbols of
expression, although even then it may claim somewhat erroneously to be giving
effect to the 'intention' of the parties.
Hughes is an exercise in construction.
"44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
'Justice Horace Gray's opinion in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894), is an
invaluable synopsis of the development of federal law and its relationship to the
divergent laws of most of the states.
The English law is comprehensively treated in HALL, AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS

OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA-SHORES OF THE

REALm (1830); and MooRE, A HISTORY OF THE FoREsHoRE (1888). Moore's work
contains, interalia, his editions of Loan HALE, DE JURE MARIS, and HALL, op. cit. supra.

Moore announces his purpose to deal with the "unfairness of the arguments put
forth by Mr. Hall" and his "unquestioned bias in favor of the Crown." Id. at xxvii.
Moore's particular villain, however, is Mr. Thomas Digges. Prior to the time of
Elizabeth I, "no idea of the prima facie theory of the ownership of the is prizvatum
of the foreshore existed in the mind of any man." Before Digges invented the theory,
the King's rights were those of the lord of a particular manor, but the corrupt judges
in the reign of Charles I seized on Digges' invention, and Lord Hale boldly stated it
to be the law. Id. at ,xxi-xxxii.
Dean Everett Fraser also pays tribute to the inventiveness of Thomas Digges,
"engineer, surveyor, and lawyer," in Title to the Soil nurder Public 1aters. 2 MiNiN.
L. Rxv. 313 (1918). This learning confirms the writer's long-held suspicion that
it is dangerous to permit an engineer to familiarize himself with law.
"Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845):
When Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with the
original States, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so
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vigorous dissenting opinion survives to remind us that this rule, which
is not expressly stated in the Constitution, has less universality or
necessity, perhaps, than the law of nature and nature's God to which
the declarers of our independence appealed. 5 However, the rule has
been affirmed and reaffirmed, on several occasions with express application to the State of Washington.'
The seaward boundary of the states' domain was once thought to
extend at least three miles from their coastlines, also on the basis of
Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan. United States v. Californiadisabused us of
that notion in 1947." 7 Expectations of the states were partly restored
by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.1 However, the 1947 decision,
the 1953 legislation correcting the result of the decision, and litigation
far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession
and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided
for in the deed of cession, and the legislative acts connected with it.
Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911), holding that Oklahoma could not be
prevented by its enabling act of admission from removing its capital from Guthrie
to Oklahoma City before 1913, described Pollard's Lessee as a "controlling case."
Justices M cKenna and Holmes dissented.
' Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
Opinion of the Court was by Justice McKinley, dissent by Justice Catron. The
Court's opinion rests heavily on reasoning of Chief Justice Taney's decision in
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). Justice Catron could not satisfy
himself how title to lands under navigable waters passed from the United States,
which necessarily held title prior to statehood, to the newly formed state.
"°A number of cases are collected in Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1959). Cases from Washington
include: Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) ; McGilvra v.
Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909); Baer v. Moran Bros. Co., 153 U.S. 287 (1894); Mann v.
Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894).
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, supra note 15, rates roughly seven columns in Shepard's
Citator, compared to nineteen columns for Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), through the 1964 supplement. In the 1943-1964 supplement, Pollard'sLessee
,. Hagan was in the process of overtaking Marbury v. Madison.
17332 U.S. 19 (1947).
-967 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1962). Constitutionality was upheld
in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). California's boundary was established in
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 889
(1965).
A lawyer's argument in behalf of the state against the United States or its patentee
might be made from the court's resolution of one issue in the latter case. Is the
baseline from which the state's seaward boundary under the 1953 act determined from
the average of all low tides or the average of the lower of two daily low tides? The
court chose the latter alternative, upholding California's contention as against a
contrary recommendation by a special master before the Submerged Lands Act of
1953 passed. 381 U.S. at 175-76.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion on this point does not bear the earmarks of a
declaration of a great and universal principle, but it does decide that "line of
ordinary low-water" in a 1953 federal statute refers to the lower of two daily low
tides. The words "line of ordinary high tide" in the Washington Constitution are
sufficiently similar to suggest that it is equally reasonable to construe them as a
reference to the average of the higher of the two daily high tides.
This alternative was not argued by the State of Washington in Hughes, and
would be less generous to the state than the vegetation line which the Washington
court adopted. A reversal by the Supreme Court in Hughes might leave it as a
possible second attempt, more generous to the state than Borax.
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over the federal legislation all involve low water line, with which we are
not here concerned. Our concern is with the upland boundary.
There are two exceptions to the Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan rule:
(1) Prior to statehood, the United States held lands beneath navigable
waters in trust for the future states. During that period Congress
could create vested rights in those lands. 9 However, Congress never
did so by any general law. 0 (2) A vested right created by the laws
of the nation ceding territory to the United States prior to the cession
is recognized in conformity with treaties and statutes of the United
States as well as the law of nations.21
Neither exception is important to the problems considered here.
Nor are we concerned with the navigational servitude by which federal
powers not related to title may be exercised. Hughes and Samson
Johns decided the boundary between uplands owned or conveyed by
the United States and lands below the line of high tide which are
owned or have been conveyed by the State of Washington. 23
The Hughes and Samson Johns cases present three issues, identified
" See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 28 (1894); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S.
(9 How.) 470 (1850) ; Narrows Realty Co. v. State, 52 Wn. 2d 843, 846, 329 P.2d 836,
838 (1958).
See Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273, 283 (1894) ; Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 58 (1894).
"E.g., Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891) ; San Francisco v.
LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656 (1891).
'Navigational servitude cases may, however, involve fixing high-water mark.
See Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cert. dcnied,
382 U.S. 902 (1965), which employed a vegetation line test to establish the limit to
which the United States may raise a river level without paying compensation for
impairment of a municipal sewer system. Rivers and lakes require a factual determination of navigability for the purpose both of navigational servitude and title
problems, but the ocean beach below high water is all treated as if it underlay
navigable waters. Baer v. Moran Bros. Co., 153 U.S. 287 (1894).
The never-never land of the servitude is explored comprehensively by Mforreale,
Federal Power in Western Waters: the Navigation Power and the Rule of No
Ccmpensation, 3 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1963), to reach the undeniable conclusion that
the absence of constitutional restraint permits Congress to perpetrate all sorts of
outrages-most of which, we think, Congress is unlikely to attempt.
In Hughes the issue was the boundary between federally-patented upland and
state-owned tideland. The conclusions should be equally applicable to the boundary
between federally-owned upland and tideland conveyed into private ownership by the
state. However, if ramifications of the Clearfield doctrine (which determined that
federal common law constitutes a penumbra determining certain rights relating to
government checks, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943))
create a distinction between land owned by the United States and land patented by
the United States, see part III C infra, the same reasoning or lack of reasoning
might permit or require different treatment of tidelands owned and tidelands
patented by the state.
The Washington court calls its decision the "reaffirmance of a rule of property
established by many prior superior court decisions ... and of the rule relied upon
over the years in a myriad of land transactions between individuals and between
the state and individuals." Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 787, 801, 410 P.2d 20,
28 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
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here by the tag lines which label the three principal parts of this
article:
(1) The vegetation line issue. Where is the boundary between
upland and tideland? The Washington Supreme Court says that the
boundary is "the line of ordinary high tide," "the line which the water
impresses on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the
soil of vegetation." 24 In contrast, the court of appeals determined that
the boundary is the line of mean high tide established by "the average
elevation of all high tides as observed at a location through a complete
tidal cycle of 18.6 years," and is located "where that unchanging
elevation meets the shore. 2
Wherever these two lines differ, as frequently they will, the Washington court's vegetation line will always, we think, be found inland
from the line established by the average of the high tides. The
difference may be substantial. In the Hughes case, the two lines, both
established as of the present time, were separated by a horizontal
distance of 386 feet.20
(2) The accretion issue. When is the boundary established? The
Washington Supreme Court decided that "the line of ordinary high
tide" is a fixed line, determined as of November 11, 1889, when
Washington became a state. The court of appeals decided that the
boundary is a line "as it exists at any particular time" except when
7
movement has been caused by sudden avulsions.1
' See 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 799, 410 P.2d at 26.

294 F.2d at 834.
Reasons for the difference between the two lines are discussed at text accompanying notes 39-41 infra. Our assertion that the vegetation line will always be
inland, in the event of any divergence, is based on our own assumptions (a) that
the vegetation referred to is of a type peculiar to the land, and (b) that inundation
by sea water prevents the growth of such vegetation, even if inundation is less
frequent than every day. Expert testimony to the contrary may be found in the
Borax record contradicting the second assumption, but we nevertheless believe it a
sound hypothesis. See note 89 infra.
2No
question of avulsions was involved in Hughes or Samson Johns. In
Samson Johns the Court of Appeals distinguished Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324, 337 (1877), quoting the opinion to the effect that while it is "generally conceded" that riparian title attaches to gradual and imperceptible accretion by natural
causes, title to "sudden accretions" is a question each state decides for itself. 294
F.2d at 832. "Sudden accretions," by the usual usage, is a contradiction in terms.
Terminology varies. We use "accretion" to describe the process by which land is
gradually built up, and "erosion" to describe its opposite. "Reliction" is reserved for
those instances where the water gradually recedes, exposing the land, a phenomonon
that will probably occur on the ocean only when water is added to the polar ice caps
or is exported to outer space. "Alluvion" is the soil deposited in the process of
building up the land.
It has been suggested that "accretion" is not used by courts to describe movement
of boundaries of land under water. 4 TIFFANY, REAI. PROPRT § 1221 (3d ed. 1939).
This is not quite so. See Washington v. Oregon, 211 U.S. 127, 135 (1908).
"Tidelands" are lands alternately covered and uncovered by tides; "shore lands"
'
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A fixed line, however such a line is defined and established, may be
inland or it may be seaward of a moving line, depending on whether
movement has been by accretion or by erosion.25 In both the Hughes
and Samson Johns cases, the movement had in fact been by accretion.
In Hughes, the present vegetation line is 175 feet seaward of the 1889
vegetation line. The 1889 mean high tide line, as such a line was
29
defined by the court of appeals, was not located in the Hughes case.
(3) The source of law issue. To determine the boundary, the
Washington Supreme Court simply construed the Washington Constitution. The court of appeals based its decision, following Borax,
on federal common law." The constitutional basis of the federal
common law is the property clause; 31 the statutory basis is the plethora
of federal statutes dealing with federal lands.
In fact, there are three source of law questions presented by these
cases. The vegetation line and accretion issues raise separable problems. The third is whether Samson Johns can be severed from its
roots in Borax and thereafter survive as a rule applicable only to
as distinguished from property
property which the United States owns,
32
which the United States has patented.
are lands alternately covered and uncovered by water of rivers and lakes. "Upland"
or "fast land" is all of the rest of the land not under water.
A fussy point at which confusion may arise: Both tide and shore lands have two
boundaries, upland and on the water side. Movement by the physical phenomenon of
accretion might conceivably cause one, neither, or both legal boundaries to move.
'The dissenting judges read the Hughes majority opinion as declaring that the
boundary of the upland is fixed both against additions by accretion and subtractions
by erosion. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 808, 410 P2d at 32. See note 135 infra.
' Because the accretion and the vegetation line issues are separable, four separate
boundary lines are possible, depending on the four possible combinations of answers
to the two separate questions. Three of the four possible lines are located on the
sketch incorporated in the court's opinion reproduced in part I A, in!ra. However,
reversal of the decision by the United States Supreme Court on the vegetation line
issue would not necessarily mean that the Washington Court would adhere to its
decision on the accretion issue. The Hughes decision rests significantly on administrative construction and seventy-three superior court decisions which established the line adopted by the Supreme Court. A new line would find less support
from these sources, even as to the accretion issue, than the line successfully urged
by the Attorney General as the boundary established by these decisions and the
Commissioner of Public Lands. Cf. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944), holding that a fact established in one suit is not
conclusively established as a "mediate datum" in a second suit between the same
parties.
' A separate concurrence in Samson Johns by Judge Richard H. Chambers
records his belief that the line of title "ought to be decided by state law," but he felt
that the "road sign" in Borax pointed the other way. 294 F.2d at 834.
2:
"U.S. CoNsT. art IV, § 3, cl.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
'The Washington Supreme Court in Hughes attempted such a distinction, 67
Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29.
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I.

THE VEGETATION LINE ISSUE

The vegetation line, selected in Hughes, and the line of mean high
tide, selected in Borax and Samson Johns, by no means exhaust the
possibilities for determining the upland-tideland boundary. As a practical matter, however, the Hughes definition is likely to settle the
matter in Washington unless the United States Supreme Court, on the
basis of Borax, rejects Hughes. In Part III we shall inquire which
court should have the ultimate choice. Here, we propose to identify
as precisely as possible what each court decided, and to compare the
two rules, assuming that each court properly exercised its jurisdiction.
A. The Hughes Decision
An initial problem with the Washington court's Hughes decision is
to identify what the court decided with respect to the vegetation line
issue. The opinion is murky because sometimes the court uses the
terms "mean high tide" and "ordinary high tide" as equivalents,
sometimes in contrast, and sometimes with unascertainable meanings.
The Washington court said that Borax is not "apposite" for the
33
following reason:
Borax... establishes the rule that mean high tide (the average height of
all high waters through a complete tidal cycle) is the criterion for "ordinary high water." The case does not involve the question of accretion.
Although this distinguishes Borax on the issue Borax does not directly
involve, it ignores Borax on the issue which Borax purports to decidethe vegetation line issue.
Reading only the opinion of the Washington court, and neither the
Borax opinion nor the Hughes dissent, one might suppose that the
Washington court had followed Borax. The Hughes opinion concludes
by stating its holding in terms of "mean high tide": 34
In conclusion, we hold that the state acquired ownership of tidelands
in actual propriety November 11, 1889. The property line is the line of
ordinary high tide, which we equate to mean high tide on that date.
The impression that the Washington court intended to define "mean
high tide" precisely as Borax had defined the term, except for the
matter of dates (1889 or the present), is fortified by other passages
in the opinion. The opinion in Hughes quotes this passage from the
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 802, 410 P.2d at 29. (Second emphasis added.)

Id. at 803, 410 P.2d at 29. (Emphasis added.)
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same United States Coast and Geodetic Survey publication which the
Borax court employed in an earlier edition:3 5
In view of the variations to which the height of high water is subject,
mean high water [tide] at any place may be defined simply as the average
height of high waters at that place over a period of 19 years. [Bracketed
word supplied by the court.]
Immediately following this quotation from the Coast and Geodetic
Survey, the court in Hughes identified the trial court's error:"0
In its finding of fact, the trial court stated: "mean high tide of the
Pacific Ocean is defined as the average elevation of all high tides as
observed at a location through a complete tidal cycle of 18.6 years, and
the actual western boundary line of plaintiff's property is where that
elevation meets the shore as it exists at any particular tine."

Since the italics were added by the supreme court, it might appear that
only the italicized portion is designated as erroneous.
These passages, particularly when coupled with the court's holding
quoted above, seem to indicate that the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
the trial court, the United States Supreme Court, and the Washington
Supreme Court are all of one mind about the definition of "mean high
tide" and its application in determining the boundary between upland
and tideland (except as to the matter of date). However, two further
passages appear 3 7-- the first of which immediately follows the quotation of the trial court's finding-which seem to say: (a) that "mean
high tide" and "ordinary high tide" are quite different; and (b) that
the Washington court chooses the latter over the former.
Since the line of "mean high tide" is an average over a period of years
of the two daily high tides, one being higher than the other, it is apparent
that the higher high tide will wash inland from the line of "mean high

tide." This is illustrated by an exhibit showing the observed high tide
on January 23, 1963 at a point a few feet south of plaintiff's property
to have been 130 feet inland from the line of predicted "mean high

tide."3 The difference in elevation was 3 feet. In the instant case, in
front of plaintiff's property the distance between the line of "ordinary
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 797, 410 P.2d at 26. The court's quotation is from MAMsER,
No. 135, p. 86 (rev. ed
1951). Both the first edition (1927) and the second edition of this work are by
H. A. Mariner, Assistant Chief, Division of Tides and Currents, U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey. The first edition provided the concepts employed by the court in
Borax, 296 U.S. at 26-27.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 797, 410 P.2d at 26. (Emphasis by the court.)
'Ibid. (Emphasis by the court.)
' Compare the Attorney General's brief, quoted at text accompanying note 40
infra, which ascribes the 130-foot difference to waves, ocean swells, and seiches.
(Footnote ours.)
'1

DEP'T COmmERcE, COAST & GEODETIC SURVEY, SPECIAL PUB.
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high tide" in 1889, as defined by the state, and "mean high tide," as
presently determined by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey
and adopted by the trial court, is 561 feet; the difference in elevation is
14.25 feet....
"Mean high tide" is measurable and determinable.
On the other hand, the "line of ordinary high tide" as used in article
17 of the constitution is not a term of technical exactness. It is indefinite
at best and an oversimplification of a phenomenon inherently complex
and variable. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we deem
the word "ordinary" to be used in its everyday context. The "line of
ordinary high tide" is not to be fixed by singular, uncommon, or exceptionally high tides, but by the regular, normal, customary, average, and
usual high tides. One cannot sit and watch the tide reach its stand at
different elevations on each turn as it ebbs and floods without realizing
that a line to be fixed by it must be based upon an average. Thus the
line of "ordinary high tide" is the average of all high tides during the
tidal cycle.
The court concluded that the boundary is the vegetation line, that
"line which the water impressed on the soil by covering it for sufficient
periods to deprive the soil of vegetation."3 9 The relationship of this
line to the lines of ordinary and mean high tide can be discovered only
by resort to the sketch (reproduced on the following page) which the
court helpfully provides, and the explanation found in the statement of
facts in the Attorney General's brief.
A total of 561 feet separates the line which Mrs. Hughes sought to
establish and the line accepted by the court. The sketch identifies the
former as "Present USC & G Survey-Mean High Tide" and the latter
as "1889 Line of Vegetation (Ordinary High Tide)." A horizontal
distance of 130 feet and three feet in elevation (10.5 minus 7.5) are
shown separating the most seaward of these lines from one labelled
"Line actually reached by water when ocean at Mean High Tide." A
horizontal distance totaling 386 feet separates the most seaward line
from one labelled "1963 Line of Vegetation (Ordinary High Tide)."
The 386 feet is the distance that separates a boundary established
by the Borax rule, adopted from the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and
a boundary that might be established by the Washington court's
vegetation line rule, were there no accretion issue in the case. Regrettably, the court leaves us with a wholly inadequate explanation of what
accounts for this difference of 386 feet.
"See

66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 799, 410 P2d at 26, quoting from Harkins v. Del Pozzi,

50 Wn. 2d 237, 240, 310 P.2d 532, 534 (1957).
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The difference apparently consists of two components: (1) 130
feet is the difference between mean high tide, as defined in Borax,
and the line actually reached by the water when the sea is at the mean
high tide elevation. In other words, it is the difference between a line
established at high tide by the plane surface of a waveless ocean, which
does not exist in nature, and the line established by the waves which
wash the shore at that elevation, where Mrs. Hughes' real estate is
located. (2) The balance of 256 feet may be accounted for by a vegetation line determined by waves from tides which are higher than the
18.6 year average. This is not necessarily the average of the higher of
the two daily high tides, but is fixed by the biological wisdom of plants
which have not deposed to specify the precise frequency or intensity
of sea water irrigation which makes the habitat unsatisfactory.
The writer has observed what is locally described as the "grass line"
at the location of the Hughes property. It can be more appropriately
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depicted on a large scale map by heavy crayon or water color brush
than by the fine line of a pen. A single plant can be uprooted by hand.
Whether one can be planted and nurtured at a lower elevation, the
writer does not know. These questions are irrelevant, however, unless
the court's decision on the accretion issue should be reversed or overruled, because the 1889 line of vegetation is not observable, and that
is the line which turned out to have legal significance.
The Attorney General's statement of facts in his opening brief to
the Washington Supreme Court accounts for the 386-foot separation
somewhat differently and more clearly than does the court:4 °
The Del Pozzi41 "line of vegetation" rule gives the public 386 feet more
tidelands than it could claim under the "mean high tide" rule. Three
considerations explain this difference.
First, when the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey makes its measurements of the tides, it eliminates irregularities in the sea level caused by
larger waves, ocean swells, and seiches. In front of Mrs. Hughes' property, these phenomena add three feet of elevation to the sea level at all
times. As a result, when the ocean is at the level of mean high water, the
waters actually reach land at an elevation three feet higher and 130 feet
further inland, than the line of mean high tide itself.
Secondly, the line established on the ground under the Del Pozzi rule
is undoubtedly established by the daily higher high tides, whereas the
line of mean high tide is the averaging of the daily higher high tides with
the daily lower high tides. Mean high tide is therefore a calculated elevation which is exceeded, on the average, of once every day even if large
waves, oean swells, and seiches are ignored.
Finally, the line of mean high tide, being calculated over the 19 year
period, by definition ignores those changes in sea level which are of
lesser duration. It likewise ignores the action of the water upon the
ground. Where the beach is as at and open as in the areas we are now
concerned with, it is only reasonable to expect the incoming tides to run
up the land beyond the actual elevation of the sea itself.
The Hughes opinion leaves two major problems:

(1) Why was the

"Opening Brief for Appellant, Statement of Facts, pp. 25-27, Hughes v. State, 67
Wash. Dec. 2d 787, 410 P.2d 20 (1966). (Emphasis in original.) Footnotes, which
are citations to the record, are omitted.
The Attorney General, in his second assignment of error, id. at 28, precisely
isolated the vegetation line issue: "The trial court erred in holding that the 386
feet of beach between the present line of mean high tide and the present line of
vegetation is not a part of the public shore and beach reserved forever for the use of
the people by chapters 105 and 110, Laws of 1901." By footnote he added this
definition: "By 'line of vegetation' we mean the line of ordinary high tide as
defined by this court in Harkins v. Del Pozzi, 50 Wn. 2d 237, 240, 310 P.2d 532
(1957)." See note 198 infra and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Laws
of 1901.
1
Reference is to Harkins v. Del Pozzi, 50 Wn. 2d 237, 240, 310 P.2d 532, 534
(1957), and the language quoted at text accompanying note 45 infra. (Footnote ours.)
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vegetation line selected as the boundary? (2) How did the court
decide that the legal description quoted in the opinion42 conforms to the
line of vegetation in 1889?
The court made a substantial attempt to justify its vegetation line
formula in terms of judicial precedent. The result of its effort is not
impressive. The major reported judicial precedent cited for a vegetation line boundary is Harkins v. Del Pozzi,43 a casual consideration of
the issue at best.
In Del Pozzi, a superior court, whose decision was reversed on other
grounds, had made a finding of fact that "the line of ordinary high
water, salt water, or line of mean high tide as the same ebbed and
flowed" in a particular location was impossible to determine from the
time of statehood until 1910, but from 1910 until 1956, the "mean
high tide line" had been located along the westerly boundary of a
sandspit, "as more particularly shown in Defendant's Exhibit 35 " '44
The Del Pozzi court's quotation of the entire finding was followed
by this paragraph:4
No error is assigned to this finding, and hence, for the purpose of this
action, the line of ordinary high tide is as established by exhibit No. 35.
[Citation omitted.] The line of ordinary high tide is that line which the
water impresses on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive
the soil of vegetation and destroy its value for agricultural purposes.
Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 234 P.2d 446 (1951).
If the first quoted sentence is taken at face value-and there is no
reason not to do so-the second sentence is unnecessary to the decision
and hence dictum. A more serious deficiency is pointed out by Judge
Hill's dissenting opinion in Hughes.4" Driesbach v. Lynch is an Idaho
case involving Lake Pend Oreille. It had little to do with tides.
42 The court quoted the legal description from the answer and cross complaint of
the state, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 789, 410 P.2d at 21:
Beginning at a point whose Y coordinate is 436,139.17 and whose X coordinate
is 1,104,683.64, referred to the Washington Coordinate System, South Zone,
and running thence on an azimuth of 1"14'05" 3412.79 feet to a point whose Y
coordinate is 432,727.18 and whose X coordinate is 1,104,610.10, referred to
said coordinate system.
By apparent error, the Pacific Reporter reproduces the number which we have
italicized as 432.727.18, providing an illustration why every law library should maintain,
if at all possible, both official and unofficial state reports.
The Washington Coordinate System is established by WASH. REv. CODE ch. 58.20
(1958). It constitutes a system of legal description, and of course has no bearing on
how the described line was in fact determined.
,350 Wn. 2d 237, 310 P.2d 532 (1957).
"Id. at 240, 310 P.2d at 534.

"Ibid.
4"67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 806, 410 P.2d at 31.
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Whatever the court meant in 1957 when it decided Del Pozzi, it took
it back in 1958 when it copied into a footnote a definition from Words
and Phrases of "ordinary high tide": "the usual or ordinary highwater mark, the limit reached by the "neap tides," those tides which
happen between the full and change of the moon twice in every 24
hours. ....,"7 Although the court in Hughes accurately labels its 1958
definition as dictum, it gives no reason for preferring a 1957 dictum to
one in 1958. Neap tides are contrasted with spring tides, and because
the neaps are lower, a neap tide average would be less generous to the
state's tideland claim than an average of all tides.48
Words and Phrases, in contributing the 1958 neap tide definition,
cited a California decision49 which applies a dictum delivered in Teschemacher v. Thompson"0 by Stephen J. Field while Chief Justice of
the California court. Although Justice Field reaffirmed the neap tide
rule in an opinion he wrote for the Supreme Court of the United
States,"' the rule was rejected in Borax. 2 The neap tide rule, although
ambiguously stated by Field73 and uncertain in application, is more
" Narrows Realty Co. v. State, 52 Wn. 2d 843, 844 n.3, 329 P.2d 836, 837 n.2 (1958),
citing 30 WoRDs & PHRASEs 253 (perm. ed. 1940).
' MARMER (1927 ed.), op. cit. supra note 35, at 3, in his first edition explains
"neap tides":
At times of new moon and full moon the tidal forces of moon and sun are acting
in the same direction. High water then rises higher and low water falls lower
than usual, so that the range of the tide at such times is greater than the average.
The tides at such times are called "spring tides," and the range of the tide is
then known as the "spring range."
When the moon is in its first and third quarters, the tidal forces of sun and
moon are opposed and the tide does not rise as high nor fall as low as on the
average. At such times the tides are called "neap tides," and the range of the
tide then is known as the "neap range."
It is to be noted, however, that at most places there is a lag of a day or two
between the occurrence of spring or neap tides and the corresponding phases of
the moon-that is, spring tides do not occur on the days of full and new moon,
but a day or two later; likewise, neap tides follow the moon's first and third
quarters after an interval of a day or two. This lag in the response of the tide
is known as the "age of phase inequality" or "phase age" and is generally
ascribed to the effects of friction.
See also MARmssR (rev. ed. 1951), op. cit. zitpra at 5.
' F.A. Hihn Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 170 Cal. 436, 150 Pac. 62 (1915). This
case was cited in Borax, 296 U.S. at 26 n.5, among the list of California cases which
the Supreme Court found "unnecessary to review." The most recent expression of a
California appellate court reaffirms the neap tide rule, and does so by express reference to the California cases collected in note 5 of the Borax opinion. People v.
William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rep. 215, 219 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
18 Cal. 11, 21-22, 79 Am. Dec. 151, 154 (1861). The dictum is quoted in note 75

infra.
n San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 671-72 (1891). See text accompanying note
124 infra.
2296 U.S. at 26.
Field stated, see text accompanying note 124 infra, that the boundary was the
neap tide line and the line of vegetation, a physical impossibility in some, if not all,
cases. The neap tide line, by definition, is always below the line established by the
average of all high tides; in Hughes, the vegetation line is 386 feet above the
average of all high tides.
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generous to the upland owner than the Borax rule for which Mrs.
Hughes contended.5 4
Another more venerable, but even less convincing, authority than
Del Pozzi is cited by the court in support of its vegetation line conclusion: "In Shelton Logging Co. v. Gosser, 26 Wash. 126, 66 Pac.
151 (1901), this court had already considered the line of vegetation
and the line of mean high tide to be the same."" This characterization
of Gosser is not wholly accurate. In Gosser, the court refers to several
boundary lines shown on a plat reproduced in the opinion. Two such
lines are described as "the mean high-tide line and the line of vegetation." However, in speaking of another, the court says, "The line 6-7
in the plat is practically along the line of vegetation, and is the mean
high-tide line." 6 "Practically" is a troublesome word because it indicates that there is a difference, although slight. In any event, it appears
that the boundary between upland and tideland was not in controversy
57

in Gosser.

An even earlier Washington decision, Baer v. Moran Bros. Co.,"s
was not cited in Hughes. That decision gave apparent approval to the
neap tide rule, characterizing "lands over which the high monthly tides
flowed, but not the ordinary daily tides" as upland? Borrowing
ambiguity from Justice Field, however, the same opinion also seems to
support a vegetation line rule.6"
From this discussion, it is clear that there was no clear and controlling precedent available to the court in Hughes. The reported cases
provide little support for the Hughes result. Despite its citation of
authority, the court seems to have relied primarily on the boundary
established in seventy-three unreported suits, affecting 322 private
ownerships, instituted against the state to establish what the court in
Hughes describes as "this boundary."'" In each instance, the state
prevailed; in none was an appeal taken. Concerning their determina130 WoRs & PERASES (Supp. 1966, at 100) now has two inconsistent definitions,
from Washington cases, of "ordinary high tide": Hughes, and the 1958 dictum from
Narrows Realty Co. v. State, 52 Wn. 2d 843, 844 n.3, 329 P.2d 836, 837 n.2 (1958),
which Hughes disowned. No definitions from Borax or Samson Johns are included in
this section of Words & Phrases.
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 799, 410 P.2d at 27.
' Shelton Logging Co. v. Gosser, 26 Wash. 126, 129, 66 Pac. 151, 152 (1901).

See id. at 131, 66 Pac. at 153.

'2 Wash.608,27 Pac. 470 (1891), aff'd, 153 U.S. 287 (1894).
0 Id. at 614-15, 27 Pac. at 472.
1 Ibid. The court, in discussing San Francisco Say. Union v. Irwin, 28 Fed. 709
(C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (opinion by Justice Field), aff'd per curiam, 136 U.S. 578 (1890),

seems to agree with Justice Field that vegetation can grow on soil submerged only by
the higher spring tides.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 802, 410 P.2d at 26.
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tions of the vegetation line issue, the Washington Supreme Court tells
C2

us:

Following the decision of this court in Harkins v. Del Pozzi, [citation
omitted] the superior court judgments entered thereafter further described the 1889 line as the "line which the water impresses on the soil
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of vegetation."
This added nothing to the line which had already been surveyed and
established.
Superior court judgments, unreported and unappealed, are not usually given great weight as judicial precedents. The Hughes court's
use of them may be explained by the court's indication that the judgments merely started to use a new explanation, beginning in 1957, to
describe the determination of "the line which had already been surveyed and established." The weakness and confusion of the reported
precedents, however, lead one to wonder what the Hughes court
thought had been the basis for establishing the line.
It is apparent that the boundary fixed in Hughes had been surveyed63
and established, because the court gives its precise legal description.
Regrettably, however, the court tells us nothing about the survey,
when, and more particularly how, it was made, under what statutory
authority, or what were and whence came the instructions to the
surveyors who made it.6 4 We are informed that it was made in 1949before the Del Pozzi decision-under the direction of the Commissioner of Public Lands.
The most authoritative explanation of the practice of the Commissioner of Public Lands we have discovered is contained in the
printed record of the Samson Johns case.6" Frank 0. Sether, an
Assistant Commissioner of Public Lands, testified for the State of
Washington in 1954, three years before the Del Pozzi decision. His
testimony is both more pertinent and more informative than the Idaho
Supreme Court's consideration of the non-tidal waters of Lake Pend
Oreille.
Mr. Sether testified that he was not an engineer. He had served in
various capacities in the Washington Department of Lands for three
-'Id.at 799, 410 P.2d at 27.
See note 42 supra.
See text accompanying note 220 infra, where the statement of the executive
officer of the State Lands Commission of California is quoted. He explains why he
'

cannot, from information available, determine where a mean or neap high tide line
used to be for purposes of complying with a court's direction to fix "an average,
mean, or ordinary line of the shore."

Transcript of Record in Court of Appeal, pp. 99-116, 294 F2d 830.
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months short of thirty-four years. He had worked on all court cases
affecting his office, and on all legislative matters. He had received
training in the interpretation and application of the laws of the State
of Washington from his predecessor, a Virs. M. H. Tamblyn, Secretary of the Board of State Land Commissioners, and from a Mr.
Doane, chief engineer. Mrs. Tamblyn had remained with the Board
until her resignation nine months after Mr. Sether was first employed.
She had worked in the office since 1898.
Mr. Sether described the practice of the Commissioner in this passage from the Sampson Johns Transcript of Record on appeal to the
Court of Appeals: 6"
Q. You are familiar too, I presume, with the fact that some of these
so-called accretions have been built up since this State became a member
of the Union, is that correct?
A. Yes. We take the position that the accretions that have been built
up since the-since November 11th, 1889 belong to the State of 1NTashington. [402]
Q. And that was the date the State was admitted to the Union.
A. Admitted to the Union. [403]
Q. And what has been the historical interpretation of the meaning of
"ordinary high tide line" or of "high tide line", you'd say?
A. Well, weMr. Heidlebaugh: If Your HonorA. -we consider the high tide line in disposal of tidelands as being
approximately the line where vegetation ceases. [412]
Q. Has that been the interpretation of what is meant by the "line of
ordinary high tide" as applied by the officeA. Yes.
Q. -down

through the years?

A. That's right.
Q. As being the line where vegetation ceases to grow, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, that line as situated in 1889, when we became a State, is the
historical application of the Constitution and these laws as it applied to
this area of land, is that correct?
c Id. at 103-04, 114-16. The bracketed word "omission" indicates our own omission
from that printed record. Bracketed page references to the transcript are retained from
the original.
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A. That's right. [413]
[Omission.]

Q. Now, Mr. Sether, one more question. Has it always in the history of
the department of Public Lands of the State of Washington-has it
always been determined that the line of ordinary high tide is the line
where vegetation ceases to grow?
A. That's our-

[462]

Mr. Heidlebaugh: Well, I'll object to that line of testimony
A. -office

interpretation

The Master: Just a minute with your answer
Mr Heidlebaugh: There's been no showing there's been any necessity
to make such a determination Your Honor.
The Master: I believe he can testify as to the practice of his office, in
the administration of these affairs.
A. (Continuing) We areThe Master: I want to preserve his objection, too, in the record.
Let the witness testify there about the practice of the department is and
was [sic].
A. (Continuing) : We are selling tidelands at all times, and we have
to fix prices on them, and we send people out to examine them, and we
consider that the line where vegetation ceases is the approximate location
of the line of ordinary high tide and in fixing prices, we fix prices on
lands from that point out to the line of extreme low tide. So, that in
every instance there is a determination as to where that line of ordinary
high tide is.
Q. What was your answer relative to the historical [463] application
of the words "line of ordinary high tide" as meaning?
A. Approximately the line of where vegetation ceases to grow.

Q. What do you mean by "approximately"?
A. Well, it's-we-it's pretty well marked there. It might vary a few
feet one way or the other, but it'sQ. What line might vary?
A. The line where vegetation ceases to grow.

Q. Well, is it true or is it not true that the two terms mean the same
historically?
A. Yes. They do, yes. [464]
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So far as appears from the printed record, Mr. Sether was neither
cross-examined nor contradicted. His testimony with respect to the
practice of surveying a beach was generally substantiated by two
witnesses who had earlier testified.67 However, the critical questionhow does the State of Washington determine where the vegetation line
was located in 1889?-was not asked.
Hughes decided that the boundary is the line of vegetation as of
1889. Why this line was chosen remains unclear. How it is to be
determined is even less clear. Although the court quoted the precise
legal description of the boundary line in front of Mrs. Hughes' property, it leaves us with no idea how to find similar boundaries in the
rest of the state. By contrast, the Borax opinion not only defined the
boundary line, but also leads us to the Coast and Geodetic Survey
publications, which provide a method for locating the line upon the
ground applicable to all tidelands.
B. The Borax Decision
Borax arose when the City of Los Angeles, grantee of tidelands by
acts of the California legislature, sued the Borax Company in a state
court to quiet the city's title to tideland adjacent to Mormon Island, a
valuable and litigation-prone bit of real estate in Los Angeles harbor.5
Borax Company, which deraigned title to the island under a federal
patent issued in 1881, removed to the United States District Court."0
The district court dismissed the complaint after the city's evidence
showed that the land claimed by the city lay above the federal survey
line referred to in Borax Company's patent. The court held that the
federal survey was a determination of what constituted the public
" Charles Pierce, Captain and Supervisor of the Northwest District, United
States Coast and Geodetic Survey, testified that the storm water line and the line of
vegetation were identical and marked the margin of the beach condition. Transcript of Record in Court of Appeal, pp. 95-96, 294 F.2d 830. Thomas A. Tillman.
cadastral engineer for the Bureau of Land Management, testified that the line of
vegetation was used in locating the meander line of the beach. Id. at 85-87.
Chronology of the Borax litigation is set out in note 7 slupra.
In Dominguez de Guyer v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723, 724 (1897), Justice Harlan
described Mormon Island as less than one acre "at mean high tide" and "about
18.88 acres" at mean low tide. The survey of 1880, by W.H. Norway, contract
surveyor for the General Land Office, showed an average of 18.88 acres surveyed,
an illustration of the wisdom of the rule that meanders are not established as boundaries. The survey in Borax is discussed, 74 F.2d at 902.
' Grounds stated by Borax Company for removal were diversity of citizenship and
a controversy under laws of the United States, identifying the act of California's
admission, 9 Stat. 452 (1850), and the federal laws under which Mormon Island
was surveyed and patented. Record in United States Supreme Court, pp. 14, 22-23,
27, 296 U.S. at 10.
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lands by the land department of the United States, and not subject to
collateral attack.7"
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,7 this decision
was reversed on the ground that a meander survey, according to a
long line of United States Supreme Court cases, does not purport to
establish boundary. 72 Judge Curtis Wilbur's opinion declared that the
boundary was "the shore line of Mormon Island and not the traverse
73
lines of the patent" which incorporated the survey.
Although no attempt was made to locate the shore line, an attempt
was made to define it. Judge Wilbur, who wrote the opinion and was a
former member of the California Supreme Court, quoted 74 the dictum
from Justice Field's opinion for the California Court in Tesckemacher
v. Thompson 7G which had originated a neap tide rule in California.
5 F. Supp. at 282.
74 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1935).
' Cases are collected in the opinion, 74 F.2d at 902. Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1869), is perhaps the leading case.
Meander lines can be made boundaries if state law makes them so and they are
seaward of the high tide line that would otherwise be the boundary. In Washington,
a meander line is a boundary if seaward of the line of ordinary high tide, and
title extending to the meander line was initiated prior to statehood. Narrows Realty
Co. v. State, 52 Wn. 2d 843, 329 P.2d 836 (1958). The decision results from an
early construction of article XVII, §2 of the Washington Constitution validating
federal patents to tideland prior to statehood. Illogical, the rule treats as patented
that which the United States law determines was not covered by patent, but it is a
federally permissible illogic and well settled. See Washington cases collected in Port
of Seattle v. Oregon & "Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 n.1 (1921).
Meander lines may also have evidentiary significance:
While government meander line surveys may be considered as evidence of the
actual high water lines, as they existed at that time, they are not conclusive as
to the actual waterline as it existed then or later.
Mood v. Banchero, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 822, 826, 410 P.2d 776, 779 (1966) (opinion by
Langenbach, J. pro tem., who did not participate in the Hughes decision rendered
the same day).
7,74 F.2d at 902.
71Id. at 905.
'The dictum from Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11, 21-22, 79 Am. Dec.
151, 154 (1861), is as follows. Only the portion shown in italics was quoted by
Judge Wilbur, 74 F.2d at 905.
We are satisfied that the verdict is not justified by the evidence. No instructions were given as to the meaning of the language, "usual high water mark," and
the jury evidently fixed it at the limit which the monthly Spring tides reachtides which occur only at the full and change of the moon. The term "usual,"
employed by the Court, is ambiguous. The limit of the monthly Spring tides is,
in one sense, the usual high water mark; for, as often as those tides occur, to that
limit the flow extends. But it is not the limit which we refer when we speak of
"itsual" or "ordinary" highwater mark. By to
that designation we mewt the limit
reached b, the neap tides; that is, those tides which happen between the full and
change of the moon, twice in every twenty-four hours. Yet the jury, from want of
proper instruction, must have taken a different view, and considered the language
as referring to the limit which the monthly Spring tides attained, or else have
acted, in rendering their verdict, in mere caprice, as there was no evidence before
them, so far as the record discloses, that the neap tides ever covered the land in
controversy. (Lord Hale's Treatise De Jure Mars, 26; Lowe v. Govett, 3 Barn.
& Adol. 862; Angell on Tide Waters, Ch. 3; Hall on Rights to the Sea.)
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The Borax Company contended that if the survey line was rejected,
the neap tide rule should be adopted to define the shore line. The
court, however, rejected the neap tide rule on the ground that it was
not supported by Hall on Rights to the Sea, which Field had cited,
and that it would not provide a definite or fixed boundary. 73
Instead the court said that the line "is the boundary between
tillable land or land available for agricultural purposes and land so
frequently covered by the sea that it is useless for agricultural purposes."7 7 Although this would seem to describe a vegetation line, the
court decided that the line should be determined by the average of
all high tides measured over the 18.6 year cycle, as described in the
Coast and Geodetic Survey's PublicationNo. 135."
The following passage makes it abundantly clear that the court did
not mean that the line should be determined by the actual line of
vegetation:79
The appellant [city] ... contends for the rule that the boundary line

between the tidelands and upland is determined "by definite mark upon
the ground which has been left by the tide." This rule as to definite
mark is applicable to the highwater line of streams but not to a boundary
line of tidewaters.80
As support for the decision, but without citation of authority, and
we believe contrary to fact,"1 Judge Wilbur wrote: "This mean high
tide line is the one usually referred to by the United States government in its patents and in the work of its various departments delimit'5' 2
ing the boundary between the upland and the tideland.
From Judge Wilbur's opinion, it is not clear whether the definition
6 74 F.2d at 905.
"Ibid.
'Id. at 906. Publication No. 135 is cited at note 35 supra. As demonstrated in
Hughes, there may be considerable divergence between the mean high tide Iln, as
determined by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the vegetation line, as dterm'n.l
by the presence of plant life. See sketch in part I A supra.
"74 F.2d at 904.
The opinion cites no authority for the statement as to streams. Two provisions
of California statutes provide little basis for the statement:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 670: "The state is the owner of all land below tidewater, and
below ordinary high-water mark, bordering upon tidewater within the State; of all
land below the water of a navigable lake or stream .... "
CAL. Cirv. CODE § 830: "Except where the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tidc-water
takes to ordinary high-water mark; when it borders upon a navigable lake or
stream, where there is no tide, the owner takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at
low-water mark; when it borders upon any other water, the owner takes to the middle
of the lake or stream."
For quotations from Bureau of Land Management instructions, see text accompanying note 124 infra; note 128 infra.
8 74 F.2d at 906.
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of shore line was intended to be read as a pronouncement of federal
law or as a restatement and clarification of California law by a former
member of California's highest court.8 3 When the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit court's opinion, it affirmed
Wilbur's definition of shore line as a pronouncement of federal law. 4
The Supreme court granted certiorari on petition of the Borax
Company. Basically, two issues were presented to the Court:
1. Was the trial court correct in holding that the federal meander
line is the boundary of Borax Company's land?
2. If not "is 'ordinary high water mark', which defines the boundary
between upland and tideland, determined
(a) by the physical marks impressed by the waters upon rocks,
earth and vegetation; or
(b) by the line of the neap tides in accordance with the decisions
of the California Supreme Court...; or
(c) by a contour representing the line of mean high tide, which is
8s5
.8 foot higher than the mean of the neaps.1

The major controversy in the Supreme Court, as below, was whether
the 1880 survey determined the boundary of the property patented to
Borax Company's predecessor in 1881.6 Our concern over Borax is
with the issue which assumed somewhat secondary importance: What
was the boundary if not the meander line established by the survey?
On this issue, the Borax Company urged the Court to reject the
mean high tide line adopted by the Ninth Circuit in favor of the lower
"Judge Wilbur wrote of the Teschenracher dictum, quoted in note 75 supra, 74

F.2d at 905:
While Justice Field in the above quotation would seem to indicate that the neap
tides were all the tides between the full and new moon and inferentially exclude
from the definition of neap tides the spring tides occurring approximately at the
time of the new and full moon, the quotation is merely a rough statement of a
rule which must be more accurately defined in fixing a definite line of
demarcation.
Judge Wilbur's concern with Justice Field's accuracy, and his emphasis on California cases indicate that he may have regarded the inquiry as controlled by California
law, instead of by federal law as derived from California, English or other cases.
'' See 296 U.S. at 26-27.
Quotation is from "Questions Presented" in Borax Company's Petition for
Certiorari, p. 5.
" See 296 U.S. at 16-21.
Justice McReynolds, dissenting, id. at 27, cites Knight v. United States Land
Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891), as compelling affirmance of the district court's decree of
dismissal. That case held that a federal patent, issued in confirmation of rights
under a Mexican grant which Congress had charged the federal land department to
determine, was not subject to collateral attack in the courts. The Chief Justice's
Borax opinion for the court distinguished the Knight case on the ground that the
survey and patent in that case "related to land which, albeit tideland, had been the
subject of a Mexican grant made prior to statehood." 296 U.S. at 19.
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neap tide line which appeared to be the rule of decision by the California courts." The Borax Company argued strenuously that the
Supreme Court's decisions contemporaneous with the 1880 survey also
had adopted the neap tide line as the rule of decision.""
Alternatively, the Borax Company urged adoption of a vegetation
S7 The California courts are still attempting to apply the neap tide rule. In
People v. William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rep. 215, 219 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), a
California District Court of Appeals made this distinction for guidance of the court
below on a second trial:
The figures of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey were the only
evidence as to height of ordinary high water. As pointed out, these were based
on an average of all high tides. The California rule, however, uses the average
of all high neap tides (see California decisions cited in Borax, Ltd. v. Los
Angeles supra, 296 U.S. 10, 26, fn. 5; Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica,
supra, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 784-5). Neap tides are those occurring when the
moon is in its first and third quarters, and the high neap tides are somewhat
lower than the high spring tides occurring at times of new moon and full
moon (Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra. 296 U.S. at p.
24 ... ). It may well be that available data will correlate the datum here used
and the average of all high neap tides. But there is no evidence on that issue,
or upon the crucial question of the difference on the ground which would be
made by application of the latter figure at this particular point of the coast
line. This issue should be covered by evidence. If it shows that the difference
is negligible, or that it cannot be determined, the federal standard may be the
only evidence.
In a petition for hearing by the California Supreme Court, the California
Attorney General urged adoption of the Borax rule on the following grounds:
(1) the Teschzemacher rule is unclear since it is not apparent from the opinion
whether neap tides are tides which occur on only two days a month, or include
tides during a longer interval; (2) it makes very little difference; (3) Teschenlachcr
purports only to follow the common law, of which Borax is a better expression;
(4) later California cases, including one listed with Teschenacher in note 5 of the
Borax opinion, have abandoned the neap tide rule; (5) data are inadequate for
application of the neap tide rule; (6) confusion and inequity would result from one
rule applicable to land patented by the United States and another to land patented by
the state or patented by the United States in confirmation of Mexican grants; and (7)
the rule proposed by the district court "would deprive the public of lands which are
covered by tidal waters during the entire month, with the exception of but two days"
on the assumpton, see 1 SHA.OWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDArIES 93 (1962), that the
neap tide rule describes tides on only two days each month. Petition for Hearing
after Decision in District Court of Appeal, pp. 20-29. The petition was denied by the
California Supreme Court on July 6, 1966. In short, Borax is more favorable to the
state's claim to tidelands than the competing neap tide rule. A California decision
relied on by the California Attorney General utilizing Coast and Geodetic Survey data
but without reference to Borax is Swarzwald v. Cooley, 39 Cal. App. 2d 306, 103 P.2d
580 (1940).
' United States Supreme Court cases relied upon by the Borax Company are
San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 672 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
58 (1894) ; Knight v. United Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 186, 215 (1891) (Field,
J. concurring). Counsel reported they could find "no previous Federal decisions which
adopt mean high tide line as the boundary in preference to the physical high water
mark." Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, p. 51. Counsel described this a"
"a Federal question" upon which "the decisions of this court are uniform." Id. at 50.
Juxtaposed was the Borax Company's inconsistent argument that the California
neap tide rule was incorporated by state decisions binding on federal courts as a
construction of CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 670 and 830, quoted in note 80 supra. Id. at 53.
These California Code sections specify "ordinary high-water mark" as the
boundary between upland and state-owned tidewater lands. It is hard to attach great
significance to the statutory word "mark" because on a navigable lake or stream
"where there is no tide, the owner takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at lowwater mark." CAL. CIV. CODE § 830. Low water does not leave much physical mark.
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line which, it argued, the evidence placed seaward of the mean high
tide line." Federal surveying practice in 1880, Borax contended,
For the California Attorney General's effort to define "low-water mark," see 43
OPs. CAL. Avr'y GEN. 291 (1964) (Anthony M. Summers).
" The printed record, while unsatisfactory as a source of information about
vegetation on Mormon Island, may for that very reason have persuaded both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court to turn to the apparently clear and certain
methods offered by the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
The following passage from the cross-examination of David E. Hughes, an
engineering witness called by the City of Los Angeles, gives the record's flavor.
It should be read with the decision of the district court on second trial in mind: that
mean high tide elevation including seiche was 5.1 feet, excluding seiche, 4.7
feet. Record in Supreme Court, pp. 333-36, 339:
That he did not have any personal familiarity with the Mormon Island region
prior to 1900; that he did not know the condition of the Island in 1880 at the
time of the Norway survey and that at the time he first saw the Island it was
not a rocky island in any respect but was a sort of a soft land except a little
ridge in the south part which was a little sandy and covered by prickly grass;
that he was familiar with the early practice in the Land Department relating to
surveys, knew what instructions were given in those times; that his knowledge
went right back into the 80's; that it was the established practice of the Land
Department in surveying areas to establish as high water mark an actual mark
as it appeared on the land where the line could be ascertained or located;
that the line had to be somewhat imaginary where there were no physical
marks on the ground; that the instructions and practice were to follow the
physical marks on the ground so far as there were any; that when there was not
any physical mark on the ground, the practice was to carry the line across from
one visible mark to the next visible mark if there didn't seem to be either
hollow or hummock between; that it was the practice to the Land Department
to establish as high water mark the real mark to be traced by the surveyor and
was not an invisible line to be determined by spirit leveling; they did not use
a spirit level at all; they were not required to; the practice required the surveyor
to determine the high water mark from a line on the ground such as a line of
vegetation if it existed; that meant high land vegetation; that he did not
remember whether the custom and practice of the Land Department at that time
recognized the propriety of running the high water mark across the mouths of
small sloughs; that his attention was first brought to that in the Knight case as
he studied it years later; the case of Knight v. United Land Association, and
that he was taught in the engineering corps in the '90's that the high water mark
meant the higher highs; that he had been instructed to use the higher highs as
representing high water mark in connection with building structures and that
he had no other instructions with reference to any other type of work; that if
high water mark was the mean of the neap tides the glasswort would grow down
to about that line on an elevation of approximately 4.3 feet above the datum
plane of mean lower low water; that he himself considered the mean of the
neaps, as referred to in the court decisions, to be 4.3 above the datum plane,
whereas the mean of all the highs was 5.1 and of the higher highs 5.8, according
to his computations, and that the glasswort grows down to approximately 4.3
feet above that datum plane and in some places a little below that, and it grows
as high as twenty feet above the same datum plane;
Q And you also know, do you not, that in sheltered places the glasswort, the
dividing line between the glasswort and this rice grass that you spoke of, is
higher than it is in places that are not sheltered?
A No, I can't say that I know it. I don't know that I had thought about that.
Q I will have to refresh your memory then from your deposition. Do you
recall a published debate between you and Mr. Von Gelder, relative to what should
be treated as the dividing line between tide lands and upland?
A I do.
Q And do you recall that in your part of that, you made this statement which
is found at page 477, line 18 of your deposition: 'In localities which I have
observed, there is a marked difference between the straight sea grass on sheltered
tide land and the crinkled salt grass on the marsh land, and the change occurs at
an elevation which corresponds better with the mean of the higher high water
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would place the survey line at the vegetation line; the two were
mutually consistent and below the mean high tide line."
The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Wilbur's decision, holding that:
(1) location of the boundary presents a federal question to which
California statutes and decisions are not relevant;9 1 and (2) there was
no error in the direction to determine the boundary based on mean
than with the mean of all the highs.' Do you recall that statement in your
publication ?
A No, I do not. I could refresh my memory. I have a copy of that in my
pocket.
** * [Omission in printed record.]
Q This document that you handed me, I think, was the one I was referring to.
This was published in April, 1910, being a pamphlet of the Association of
Engineering Society.
A Yes, I recognize it.
Q Will you look at page 250, please?
* * * [Omission in printed record.]
A The quotation is correct.
Q BY MR. ASHBURN: At that time you believe that to be the case, did you?
A Yes. I was thinking about a different harbor.
THE COURT: Different what?
A Different harbors; the height to which the grass grows, or the depth to
which it grows. It was different in a sheltered harbor from what it was in a
large wind-swept harbor. The plane of mean high water is a plane attained by
the averaging of the high waters and that is all it is, and the mean lower low
water plane is merely the average height of the lower low waters....
Some lawyers and engineers contended at the time that the lowest high tides
of the month, what are today called neap tides, are the limits or partition
between proprietary lands and public lands of states. Others contended that it
was the average of all highs. While others, including myself, contended that
inasmuch as many of those highs were not in fact high, a still higher line should
be chosen, namely, 5.8.
THE COURT: Then, do I understand that opinion varied between this 4.3
and 5.8?
A Yes.
'The Borax Company expressly argued that spring tides do not interfere with
vegetation. Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, p. 55; Brief on Behalf of
Petitioners, p. 105. Justice Field in San Francisco Say. Union v. Irwin, 28 Fed.
708 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1886), aff'd per curiam, 136 U.S. 578 (1890), was apparentl
convinced that this was true in the San Francisco Bay area.
After Justice Field had passed from the scene, a federal district judge expressed
doubt about whether upland vegetation will grow on soil submerged only by the
spring tides. Sawyer v. Osterhaus, 212 Fed. 765, 775 (N.D. Cal. 1914) :
I say this with due deference as to what was held as to the lands involved in
San Francisco Savings Union v. Irwin. I cannot know what the evidence was
in that case, but am circumscribed by what was shown in this; and, moreover,
the respective situations of the tracts involved in the two cases are in some
essential respects quite different, and especially as to the effect of the flow of
the salt tides. The lands in the Savings Union Case were undoubtedly, from
their situation, affected largely by fresh waters from the streams which partially
surround them, while the present premises were, until leveed, wholly subject to
the tidal action of the waters of the bay, which daily flowed over them back and
forth between San Pablo Bay and Mare Island Straits, completely submerging
them at its highest flood, and largely so at its ordinary state. Lands so situated
cannot be classed as swamp and overflowed; they are tidelands ....
"The state statute which is declared irrelevant, 296 U.S. at 26, defines the
boundary in terms of "ordinary high-water mark," (CAL. Civ. CODE § 670, quoted in
note 80 supra) but the only state statute cited and quoted by the Supreme Court,
296 U.S. at 12 & n.1, is an uncodified legislative grant from the state to Los Angeles
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high tide as described by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, first declared: 9 2
"The tideland extends to the high water mark." For this proposition
the court cited two cases involving inland lakes (one of them nonnavigable) 9" and Skively v. Bowlby,9 involving the Columbia River
at Astoria. In Shively, the court had described tidelands as "lands
under tidewaters ...incapable of cultivation or improvement in the

manner of lands above high water mark."9
After citing these three cases, the Court in Borax proceeded to
define "high water mark": 6
This does not mean, as petitioners contend, a physical mark made upon
the ground by the waters; it means the line of high water as determined
by the course of the tides. By the civil law, the shore extends as far as
the highest waves reach in winter. 9 7... But by the common law, the
shore "isconfined to the flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides."
Blundell v. Cattcrall, 5 B. A. 268, 292. It is the land "between ordinary
high and low-water mark, the land over which the daily tides ebb and
flow. When, therefore, the sea, or a bay is named as a boundary, the
line of ordinary highwater mark is always intended where the common
law prevails." United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590.
Blundell v. Catterall,9 s defining the shore as the area covered by the
"flux and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides" is not clear. Is winter
not an "ordinary" phenomenon? Are tides limited to ocean phenomena caused by astronomic influences, or do they include other wave
and water movement?
The statement from United States v. Pacheco is no more helpful in
which speaks of "mean high tide." Probably the only significance of this is to
California lawyers who are unlikely to find Borax in their annotations to the
Civil Code. Those who find Borax, on the other hand, may not find Civil Code § 670.

"'296U.S. at 22.

Ibid. Cases cited were: Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891) (non-navigable
Wolf Lake, between Indiana and Illinois) ; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909)
(navigable Lake Union in Seattle).
" 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
Id. at 57.
S296 U.S. at 22-23.
U Concerning
the distinction between civil and common law, compare Luttes v.
State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958), with Rudder v. Ponder, 156 Tex. 185, 293
S.V.2d 736 (1956). See Winters, The Shoreline for Spanish and Mexican Grants
in Texas, 38 TEXAS L. Rm,. 523 (1960). (Footnote ours.)
'15 B. & Ald. 268, 292, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (K.B. 1821). The issue which
divided the court was not the location of the shore, but the right of way of the
public over the shore to bathe. Best, J., took judicial notice that bathing machines
are essential to the health promoting practice. However, "decency must prevent all
females, and infirmity many men, from bathing, except from a machine." Id, at 279,
106 Eng. Rep. at 1194. The majority concluded against the existence of the public's
right to cross the shore owned by the lord of the manor, whether in a bathhouse on
wheels or on foot.
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itself. However, the opinion was written by Field whose opinions both

before and after Pacheco incorporated the neap tide rule." If the
passage from Pacheco quoted in Borax is put into context, it is clear
that Field intended no departure from his view that "ordinary high-

water mark" is a vegetation line or physical mark fixed by the neap
tides.100
The decision which comes closest to supporting the Borax Court's
conclusion that highwater mark at common law is to be determined by
the average of all high tides, is Attorney General v. Chambers,"" a
decision by Lord Chancellor Cranworth in 1854. Almost two pages are
devoted to this case in the Borax opinion." 2 The Lord Chancellor
found the question of the tideland boundary "very obscure" with
"very little of modern authority." Lord Hale had given no absolutely
decided opinion, but "leaned strongly" against the Crown's right to
land covered only by spring tides. In Blundell v. Catterall,"the flux
and reflux of the sea at ordinary tides" had not been defined.
Faced with this uncertainty, the Lord Chancellor attempted to state
a principle from which a rule could be drawn: °"
In this state of things, we can only look to the principle of the rule
which gives the shore to the Crown. That principle I take to be that it
is land not capable of ordinary cultivation or occupation, and so is in
the nature of unappropriated soil. Lord Hale gives as his reason for
thinking that lands only covered by the high spring tides do not belong
to the Crown, that such lands are for the most part dry and maniorable:
and taking this passage [De Jure Maris, p. 26] as the only authority at
all capable of guiding us, the reasonable conclusion is, that the Crown's
right is limited to land which is for the most part not dry or maniorable.

From Lord Hale's principle (emphasized in the quotation), Lord
Chancellor Cranworth deduced the rule that the boundary is "the line
of the medium high tide between the springs and the neaps."' 4
' The Tescheinacher dictum by which Field shaped the California law is quoted
in note 75 supra. Field's San Francisco v. LeRoy decision, incorporated in the
Manual of Surveying Instruction (1947), of the Bureau of Land Management, is
quoted at text accompanying note 124 infra.
'In United States v. Pacheco, 68 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587 (1864), the United States
appealed from a decree confirming a Mexican grant bounded on the west by San
Francisco Bay. The Supreme Court affirmed, declaring that it made no difference
whether the civil law or common law was applicable. If Justice Field's opinion is
read against the background of his other opinions for the Supreme Courts of
California and the United States, it is apparent that Pacheco is an affirmation of the
neap tide rule which Borax held to be irrelevant to the federal question. See note
75 supra and text accompanying note 124 infra.
1014 de G. M. & G. 206, 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (Ch. 1854).
10-296 U.S. at 24-25.
(Emphasis added.)
0" 4 de G. M. &. G. at 217-18, 43 Eng. Rep. at 490.
'1 Id. at 217.
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"Maniorable" is an interesting word, not found in the second or
third editions of Webster's unabridged dictionary or in current editions
of Black or Bouvier's legal dictionaries. The Oxford English Dictionary lists it as: "erron. form of Manurable."'0 5 "Manurable" is
defined: "Of land: That can be worked or cultivated. ' nu ° It is illustrated by a quotation from Lord Hale, De Jure Marls: "For the most
part the lands covered with these fluxes are dry and manurable. '"'1
How Lord Chancellor Cranworth drew his rule from Lord Hale's
principle is more obscure than the word itself. We doubt that his
rule actually conforms to his principle. How frequently must the
water of the sea wash the soil to render it incapable of ordinary cultivation? We would suppose that the answer might depend on a
variety of variables including climate, soil, crops, and salinity of the
water.'
Unfortunately, he presents us with nothing but a not very
plausible assumption that the land above the line of medium high
tide between the springs and the neaps is capable of cultivation.' °9
Despite its prolonged discussion of Attorney General v. Chambers,
the Court in Borax did not adopt as the boundary the medium high
tide between the springs and the neaps. Instead, Borax prescribed the
average of all high tides measured over an 18.6 year cycle." 0 The
reason for its choice may perhaps be found in the convenience and
certainty promised by the Coast and Geodetic Survey's technology
and publications, but the Court does not tell us.
Unfortunately, the convenience and certainty of the Borax rule did
not have an opportunity for demonstration in the aftermath of Borax.
On remand, the district court and court of appeals held that a boundary established by estoppel under California law precluded the City of
Los Angeles from claiming to the line of mean high tide."' Even if
F3

6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 125 (1933).
Id. at 144.
M'OORE, HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 393 (1888), reprints DE JURE MARIs and

spells the word "mainorable."
"Sawyer v. Osterhaus, 212 Fed. 765, 775 (N.D. Cal. 1914), quoted in note 90 supra.
" See sketch in part I A supra, showing that vegetation in Hughes did not in
fact grow anywhere near the line of "USC & G Survey-Mean High Tide," which
approximates the line between the springs and the neaps. See note 110 infra.
at 26-27. The rule is taken from MARMER, DEP'T COMMERCE, COAST
"11296 U.S.
& GEODETIC SURVEY SPECIAL. PuB. No. 135 (1927).
1 SHALOWITZ, SHoRa AND SEA BOUNDARIES 96 (1962), says that "the line of the

medium high tide between the springs and the neaps" is almost, but not quite, the
Coast and Geodetic Survey definition which the Court applied. This useful two
volume work is published by the United States Department of Commerce, Coast and
Geodetic Survey.
U'20 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Cal. 1937); 102 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 644. On the first appeal, the court of appeals had refused to consider the
pleaded facts relating to estoppel "in view of the fact that the question was not
presented to or considered by the trial court." 74 F.2d at 904.
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estoppel had not been available, however, translation of the Supreme
Court's formula to a line upon the ground would have been impossible
without further significant refinement of that formula. Refinement
has not been provided by the Supreme Court, either in the Borax
opinion or since. The Supreme Court did not say what to do about
seiche, although the evidence in the record dealt with the problem." 2
In the opinions after remand, we find the first judicial recognition
that the sea in Los Angeles harbor does not perform exclusively according to the astronomic forces producing what the Coast and Geodetic
Survey denominates "tides."" 3 The actual water level at mean high
tide is 5.1 feet above low water datum; "tides" as the Coast and
Geodetic Survey defines the term are only 4.7 feet above low water
datum. The difference is attributable to seiche, a phenomenon produced by barometric or other influences, rather than by the gravitational attraction of the sun and moon which produces tides. In 1926,
when the Coast and Geodetic Survey first became aware of the facts
in Los Angeles harbor, it substituted the 4.7 figure for 5.1 to eliminate
the oscillations in water level attributed to seiche.
In dictum, the district court decided to follow the Coast and Geodetic Survey's practice and the court of appeals appears to have
agreed." 4 This decision would have had major consequences in establishing the disputed boundary if estoppel had not made the high
tide line problem irrelevant. One inch of vertical rise in water level
submerges acres of tidal flats like those of Mormon Island.
Why should seiche be ignored? Neither opinion after remand states
a reason. The conclusion is particularly suprising because the opinion
of the court of appeals after remand was written by Judge Wilbur,
whose earlier opinion had stated a definition in terms of "tillable land."
We would suppose that land regularly washed by seiche is no more
'Record on Appeal, pp. 397-409; Brief for Appellant, p. 17; Brief for Respondent,

p. 85.
The state of the first record is probably not such that the Court would have been
justified in deciding whether tide includes or excludes seiche. It was sufficient,
however, that the Supreme Court should have realized the problem inherent in
directing the court below to follow the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
I The seiche problem is dealt with at 20 F. Supp. 70-71, and 102 F.2d at 57-58.
Any implication that it is peculiar to Los Angeles harbor is contradicted by
WHEELER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF TIDES AND WAVES 167 (1906): "At Malta [for
example] the irregular variations of the water in the sea inlets are often sufficiently
great to completely mask the slight undulation of the lunar tide."
IARMER (rev. ed. 1951), op. cit. supra note 110, presents at page 42 a graph of the
tidal curve at Mormon Island for January 10, 1951, illustrating the seiche which,
there, is "practically a constant feature, although varying in amplitude throughout

the year." Id. at 41.
" 20 F. Supp. at 71; 102 F.2d at 57.
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"dry and maniorable," than land regularly washed by tide. Plants do
not know the difference, and neither, prior to 1926, did the Coast and
Geodetic Survey.
The decision to ignore seiche tells us something about the probable
reasons why the court of appeals and Supreme Court turned to the
Coast and Geodetic Survey in the first place. The temptation to
follow the Coast and Geodetic Survey is strong, whatever it says about
tides and related phenomena. The data, methods, and well written
publications of the agency are readily available. Satisfactory alternatives are not available where vegetation has long disappeared.
It is also understandable why a court might be reluctant to spell
out either the reason or extent to which the Coast and Geodetic
Survey, an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the source of
both the law and the facts for determining tidal boundaries. Since
the agency has no responsibility for fixing boundaries, most of the
conventional reasons for judicial deference to administrative expertise
are lacking. Yet the agency has something approaching a monoply in
recognized expertise. Some persuasiveness may be added to its conclusions by reason of the very fact that it is officially disinterested in
the consequences flowing from use of its methodology and data.
The Hughes opinion is an interesting illustration of the prestigious
nature of Coast and Geodetic Survey publications. The Washington
court quotes them copiously."' Only a careful reading of the opinion
and resort to the court's sketch reveals that "mean high tide" in the
Survey's definition and "mean high tide" in what the court states to
be its holding are widely different concepts.-" Having departed from
the Coast and Geodetic Survey's concepts, the court fails to provide
any adequate substitutes of its own. The reasons for its rule, and how
to apply its rule to locations other than the property of Mrs. Hughes,
are never stated.
C. Borax versus Hughes-Which Rule?
Both the Borax rule (followed in Samson Johns)" 7 and the Hughes
rule are unsatisfactory in terms of fidelity to a principle supporting the
rule. Borax follows the Coast and Geodetic Survey's methodology in
fixing a boundary which separates the land dry enough to be maniorable from the land not dry enough to be maniorable. The methodology,
'1'
"s

67 ,VashL Dec. 2d at 796-97, 410 P.2d at 25-26.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.

u7 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 42: 33

however, employs a concept of a waveless ocean as fictitious as the
legal dogma that any woman may produce children regardless of age
and state of health. The Borax rule offers the prospect of greater
certainty than a rule that must be adapted to varying conditions of
plant life which depend on climate, soil, and countless other factors in
addition to the behavior of the sea.
If there is to be a uniform rule, so that a clerk in the Bureau of
Land Management in Washington can determine from a document the
appropriate legal description of the real estate belonging to Mrs. Stella
Hughes or the heirs of Samson Johns in the state of Washington,
Borax comes much closer to serving the purpose than Hughes. However, Borax fails to distinguish between upland and tideland in terms
of the uses to which upland and tideland are put.
The Hughes opinion might have persuasively demonstrated that the
vegetation line more faithfully than the mean high tide line applies
the criteria which Lord Chancellor Cranworth and the United States
Supreme Court agreed should be controlling. Even in terms of certainty, vegetation line appears to be superior in some locations to mean
high tide line. One can look at the vegetation and in many instances
approximate a line. Not even the Coast and Geodetic Survey can be
sure without great effort, as the history of Los Angeles harbor demonstrates, what is tide, what is seiche, and what is the product of a prevailing offshore wind.
If the Washington Supreme Court had attempted such a demonstration, it could hardly have avoided demonstrating also that its selection
of a line fixed in 1889 frustrates the goals otherwise achieved by a
vegetation line. Physical characteristics which differentiate upland
from tideland are the characteristics of 1966, not 1889. Physical
observation of a vegetation line of 1966 is easy; observation of the
line of 1889 is impossible.
The question is nevertheless difficult because there is no agreement
on the rationale of the rule giving states ownership or power to dispose
of tidelands. The touchstone in Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan'," is navigability. This in itself is a fiction which helps not at all in selecting
a boundary. Navigability as the criterion would probably have resulted in a low-tide rather than a high-tide boundary.
Justice Catron's dissent in Pollard's Lessee noted the anomaly:
"As a practical truth, the mud-flats and other alluvion lands in the delta
of the river Mississippi, and around the Gulf of Mexico, formed of
' 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
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rich deposits, have no connection with navigation, but obstruct it,
and must be reclaimed for its furtherance.""' 9
The problem recurred some forty years later in litigation on Puget
Sound,'" by which time Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan had become an
established rule of proprety. The holder of scrip which permitted its
owner to locate a claim on federal "public lands" had selected 3,000
acres of what he claimed were mud flats shortly before Washington
was admitted to statehood. He tried unsuccessfully to persuade first
the Washington Supreme Court and then the United States Supreme
Court that these could not be lands beneath navigable waters, and
hence they were public lands of the United States subject to his claim.
The United States Supreme Court refused to judicially notice that
the situation of the claimed lands was as alleged in the claimant's
brief. But lest he or another litigant come back with a record proving
a claim to tidal mudflats, which were not navigable, the Court thought
of a better reason on which to rest the state's ownership or power to
dispose of tidelands: 121

[Even] if the area ... was shown to be as great as stated by counsel in
the brief, it would not change the fact that the land thus alternately
covered and uncovered between the dry upland and navigable water is
land which may be used in facilitating approach to the navigable waters
from the upland, and is strictly within the description of "tide lands," and
covered by the rule in respect to such lands.
This was inventive but not helpful. Any public land west of Chicago
may be used, and much of it has historically been used, to facilitate
approach to the Pacific Ocean. There is no particular reason, other
than a rule of property, why the ocean is navigable for title purposes
up to high tide line, but streams are segregated into navigable and
non-navigable reaches.' 22
We are, however, dealing with real property titles, an area where
precedent and reliance on precedent are more important than in any
other area of the law. The Hughes court rested its decision on a rule
of property. The difficulty in its decision is not with the concept of a
rule of property, but with the materials from which this particular
rule was discovered: an administrative decision, contravening the law
declared by the Washington Supreme Court, affirmed by unreported
I Id. at 233.
"Baer v. Moran Bros. Co., 2 Wash. 608, 27 Pac. 470 (1891), aff'd, 153 U.S. 287
(1894).

1' 153 U.S. at 288-89.
" See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
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superior court decisions, none of which became publicly visible until
1966, when the rule emerged as a constitutional construction applicable
to the entire state. Moreover, it is not even a rule until it becomes
clear how boundaries other than that of Mrs. Hughes' property can
be determined. We do not learn from the Hughes opinion how and
when her boundary was in fact surveyed and determined, much less
the boundaries of tidelands in the rest of the state.
Nevertheless, it seems probable that in terms of precedent and
practical reliance on precedent, a better argument can be made for a
vegetation line than for a mean high tide line as defined by Borax.
Borax was novel in 1935. Since 1935 it has had surprisingly small
influence.
In 1947, the second decade following Borax, the Manual of Surveying
Instructions published by the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management,' 2 3 defined tidelands. Its most
specific definition was provided by quotation from Justice Field's
opinion in San Francisco v. Le Roy in 1891:124
The lands which passed to the State upon her admission to the Union
were not those which were affected occasionally by the tide, but only
those over which tidewater flowed so continuously as to prevent their
use and occupation. To render lands tidelands, which the State by
virtue of her sovereignty could claim, there must have been such continuity of the flow of tidewater over them, or such regularity of the flow
within every twenty-four hours, as to render them unfit for cultivation,
the growth of grasses or other uses to which upland is applied.
This definition is inherently ambiguous when applied to the facts
of the Hughes case.' 2 5 It states both the neap tide rule, which Justice
Field had spelled out with greater particularity in Tesckemacher v.

11

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS OF THE UNITED

MANUAL
STATES

OF

379

(1947) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
The successor of Manuals of 1855, 1881, 1890, 1894, 1902 and 1930, the 1947 Manual
followed Borax by eleven years. It is prepared "for the guidance of the employees of
the Bureau of Land Management. To all others this surveying practice should be
regarded as advisory, with no attempt to interpret State law respecting the survey
of private property." 1947 MANUAL 2.
Instructions to federal surveyors are contained also in special instructions issued
from time to time and are difficult to locate and identify. They are pertinent both
to indicate what surveys and accompanying field notes purport to represent, and as
administrative constructions. See Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and
Streams, 24 MINN. L. REV. 305, 307 n.7 (1940); Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improve-

ment Co., 190 U.S. 452, 499-50 (1902) (dissent); United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d 988,
1000 (9th Cir. 1942); Kleven v. Gunderson, 95 Minn. 246, 104 N.W. 4, 6 (1905).
But cf. Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U.S. 300, 307 (1899).
1947 MANUAL 379, quoting from 138 U.S. 656, 671-72 (1891).
See note 53 supra.
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Thompson,'2 and the vegetation line rule in terms not unlike those
used in Hughes. Which line is the boundary where the vegetation line
is 386 feet above the line of mean high tide and the neap tide line is
an unascertainable distance below the line of mean high tide?
We shall never know how Stephen J. Field or his court in 1891
would have answered this question if disabused of the notion that
neap tide and vegetation lines are the same. The important fact is that
the Bureau of Land Management's instructions of 1947 are clear and
express. Its instructions for meandering, applicable to both tidal and
inland waters, 2 ' borrow authority from an Idaho decision:' 2
All navigable bodies of water and other important rivers and lakes ...
are to be segregated from the public lands at mean high-water
elevation....
...High-water mark is the line which the water impresses on the soil
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation. Raide v.
Dollar, [34 Idaho 6821, 203 P. 469 (1921).
The Borax case, significantly, is neither cited nor discussed. Perhaps
it was overlooked, but this seems unlikely. Is it possible that civil
engineers in the Department of the Interior are professionally and
bureaucratically jealous of specialists of another discipline employed in
another bureau under jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce?
Or is it that surveyors could not accomplish their assigned tasks pursuing the methods directed in Borax? Certainly in attempting to do
so they would encounter problems:
(1) Is seiche to be isolated from the tides, and if so how?
(2) When does a river become "tidal" for this purpose as it approaches the sea?
A slightly more recent publication issued in 1949 by the Bureau of
Governmental Research Services, University of Washington, provides
according to its title page, "Information for City Engineers, Surveyors,
2 9 This is
Civil Engineers, and Attorneys," with respect to boundaries."
what it says about the Hughes vegetation line problem identified with
article XVII, section 1 of the Washington Constitution: 0
See note 75 supra.
1947 MANUAL 232

makes it clear that meandering instructions apply to tidal
waters.
S1947 fANuAL 230-31.
'1

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH AND SERVSUBDIVISION AND PLATTING, AND BOUNDARIES,
WASHINGTON STATE LAWS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS.

iCEs, REPORT No. 96 ON SURVEYS,

"Id. at 28. (Emphasis in original.)
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Two terms in this section of special significance to the land surveyor
are "ordinary high tide" and "ordinary high water." In view of the area
of navigable water in the State of WVashington, it is surprising that there
seems to have been no definitive interpretation of these two terms by the
State Supreme Court of Washington. In considering the ordinary high
water mark, the United States Supreme Court has declared:
"This line is to be found by examining the bed and banks and
ascertaining where the presence and action of water are so common
and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary years, as to mark
upon the soil of the bed, a character distinct from that of the banks,
in respect to vegetation, as well as in respect to the nature of the soil
itself."
It would seem that this definition of "ordinary high water mark" also
would apply to the line of "ordinary high tide."...
This quotation, which purports to be a declaration by the United
States Supreme Court, is in fact from the concurring opinion of Justice
Benjamin R. Curtis in Howard v. Ingersoll.' The problem before the
pre-Civil War Court was to determine a boundary described as "along
the western bank" of the River Chattahoochee in Georgia's act of cession to the United States of what later became the State of Alabama. 3 2
The court did not purport to state a universally applicable principle,
but the case has nevertheless been widely cited with respect to the
vegetation line as a water boundary.
Wholly aside from the accuracy of their legal scholarship books like
the Bureau of Land Management Survey Instructions and the Washington Bureau of Public Affairs publication are relied on. The former,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 427 (1851).
"Howard v. Ingersoll, supra note 131, failed to settle the Georgia-Alabama
boundary. The interstate adjudication, also a construction of the Georgia Act of
Cession, took place some nine years later. Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. (23 How.)
505 (1860). The Court said, id. at 515, that the bed of the river belonging to

Georgia is:
... that portion of its soil which is alternately covered and left bare, as there
may be an increase or diminution in the supply of water, and which is adequate
to contain it at its average and mean state during the entire year, without
reference to the extraordinary freshets of the winter or spring, or the extreme
droughts of the summer or autumn.
The western line of the cession on the Chattahoochee River must be traced on
the water line of the acclivity of the western bank, and along that bank where
that is defined; and in such places on the river where the western bank is not
defined, it must be continued up the river on the line of its bed, as that is made
by the average and mean stage of the water, as that is expressed in the conclusion
of the preceding paragraph of this opinion.

How often must a flood or drought occur to lose its status as "extraordinary"?
Alabama v. Georgia deserves to be immortalized for the laconic observation of
Mr. Benjamin C. Howard, the reporter, who recorded that the evidence was all

documentary, that the arguments "partook rather of the character of a diplomatic

negotiation than a forensic dispute, and the reporter declines to attempt to abbreviate
them in a law book." Id. at 510.
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indeed, has independent status as evidence of an administrative practice by the cognizant federal bureau. Such books are materials out of
which a rule of property may grow.
They do not help to establish the decision in the Hughes case as a
rule of property, because neither publication is at all helpful in discovering a vegetation line of 1889. The Bureau of Land Management's
publication advises: "When by action of water the bed of the body of
water changes, high water-mark changes and ownership of adjoining
land progresses with it."'1 33 A Washington decision is cited. 34

A vegetation line as it exists today and a vegetation line as it existed
in 1889 present quite different factual and perhaps quite different legal
problems. For purposes of analysis we have isolated vegetation line
from accretion issues, and our conclusion applies primarily to a vegetation line determined as of today.
We have concluded that Borax has the obvious advantage if a universal rule must be applied because vegetation is not universal. Even
where vegetation is found, its type, characteristics, and distribution
differ. However, if a universal rule is not demanded, other criteria
favor a vegetation line boundary. The beach, in terms of most of the
uses to which the beach is adapted, begins at the line of vegetation.
There the upland ends. Even certainty and judicial convenience may
be furthered by a vegetation line in many cases. Where vegetation provides a line clearly observable and clearly related to the sea, the boundary is visible, to both the trier of fact and the surveyor. Observation
for a day is easier than observation for 18.6 years, or for a substantial
period even if less than 18.6 years.
History and reliance on history also favor a vegetation line. So does
the practice, which Borax did not purport to supplant, of establishing
a vegetation line boundary on inland waters. The difficult distinction
between inland and tidal waters is avoided.
If, however, we must seek the vegetation line in 1889 the advantages
of a vegetation line are less clear. Perhaps it makes little difference
which rule we employ in finding an 1889 line. We can guess about a
line of mean high tide as readily as we can guess about a line of vegeta1947 MANUAL 231.
""Harper v. Holston,
'"

119 Wash. 436, 205 Pac. 1062 (1922). Involved were
private titles on the Yakima River, said to be non-navigable.
1947 MANuAL 370 makes clear that accretions to land formed after patent are not
within the jurisdiction of the government.
The Washington Bureau of Governmental Research publication, op. cit. supra
note 129, at 46-48, handles the accretion problem well by reference both to Ghione,
discussed at notes 170-77 infra and accompanying text, and Washougal, discussed at
notes 189-94 infra and accompanying text.
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tion. Nevertheless, an 1889 line has no meaning in terms of the present
criteria of what constitutes a beach or what constitutes upland. If the
search is for an 1889 line, the vegetation line loses its major advantage.

II.

THE ACCRETION ISSUE

Is the boundary between upland and tideland, however defined and
located, a boundary which became fixed at the date of statehood or is it
a boundary which moves as accretion and erosion cause that line to
move? We limit ourselves, here, to examining the decisions as they
relate to the issue of a fixed or moving boundary, reserving to part III
the issues relating to source of law. In Hughes, the Washington Supreme Court held that the boundary became fixed on statehood. 3 ' In
Samson Johns, the Court of Appeals held that the boundary is movable, irrespective of state law.'
In Borax, the United States Supreme
Court did not discuss the issue as accretions were not directly involved.
The court in Hughes distinguished Samson Johns on the ground that
the United States was the owner, not merely the original source of title,
of the land in question.'Y7 No such distinction was made in Samson
Johns. The court of appeals treated its decision as controlled by
Borax, 3 " in which the United States was merely the original source of
title, not owner of the upland. Federal law, controlling according to the
court in Samson Johns, follows the common law in providing a boundary movable by erosion as well as by accretion.'
Although the Court in Borax did not discuss the accretion issue, it is
clear that if the court below had fixed the mean high tide line, under the
Court's definition, it would have established a moving boundary. The
court of appeals, whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
had noted an accretion issue, but had left the facts for determination
'67
Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29. The dissent points out, id. at 808,
410 P.2d at 32, that the majority gave no consideration to the effect of a fixed boundary where there has been erosion instead of accretion. However, the majority's
reliance, id. at 802, 410 P.2d at 29, on Washougal & LaCamas Transp. Co. v. Dalles,
Portland & Astoria Nay. Co., 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 74 (1902), indicates that it
probably intended that the upland-tideland boundary should be fixed against erosion
as well as against accretion. The court quotes, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 802, 410 P.2d at
29, the following passage from Washougal:
It cannot be that shore lands created by the erosion of the banks of a stream
within the boundaries of a private claim inure to the benefit of the state; nor can
the state claim, as shore lands, fills in a river caused by artificial means.
See text accompanying notes 187-92 infra for further discussion of the Washougal
decision.
'o 294 F.2d at 834.
'z 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29.
IS 294 F.2d at 833-34.
"Id.
at 834 & n.6 and authorities cited therein. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 1526-.33 (Casner ed. 1952) ; PATTON, TITLEs §§ 300-05 (1957) ; 6 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 983-86 (1965) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1219-29 (1939).
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by the district court, observing that "the effect of the shifting of that
line [mean high tide line] on the rights to tideland and upland are well
settled."' 4
It is paradoxical that in none of the three cases which are central to
the accretion issue in Washington-Borax, Samson Johns, and Hughes
-are the merits of the moving versus fixed boundary rule examined. In
Borax, a moving boundary was assumed-whether by reason of federal
or state law-once the Borax Company's claim to the federal meander
line, as a fixed boundary, was rejected. Samson Johns followed Borax
on the basis that federal, not state, law determines the boundary of the
upland owned or granted by the United States,' 4 ' and accretion is the
established federal rule. Hughes applied a rule of state law derived
principally from the practice of the Commissioner of Public Lands,
affirmed by seventy-three unreported superior court decisions.' 42
The only Washington decision that fully reviewed the policy considerations is the Ghione case of 1946.143 That decision in favor of the
accretion rule is rejected in Hughes, 44 at least as to tidelands.
A. The Accretion Problem
The issue on the merits is worthy of fuller examination than it received in Hughes. The problem is not confined to the Long Beach
Peninsula: accretion may occur wherever there are water boundaries.
At common law and in most jurisdictions today, the boundary moves
whenever physical movement is gradual and imperceptible. Ultimately,
this must be based on a judgment that a fixed relation to the water
body is more important than a fixed relation to the earth's surface. 4 5
,,74 F.2d at 907.

Such authority as existed was contrary to the conclusion reached in Samnson
Johns. In Herron v. Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956),
the issue was whether land lost by erosion and subsequently reemerging belongs to the
former owner or to the owner to whose land it is added by accretion. Plaintiffs were
Indian nations, defendant a successor in interest to allottees of Indian land. The
court applied the law of Oklahoma, which answered the question in favor of the plaintiff Indian nations: reemerging land belongs to the former owner. The court said,
id. at 832:
[E]ach state determines for itself questions relating to the loss of land by erosion.
submerging, or avulsion, and questions concerning the acquisition of land by
accretion.... In like manner, grants by the United States of public lands
bounded by stream, made without reservation or restriction, are to be determined
as to effect according to the law of the state in which the grant lies; and that
general rule has application to the disposal of tribal lands of Indians under guardianship.
Cf. Chocktaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Cox, 251 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1958).
'See text accompanying notes 214-17 infra.
'26 Wn.2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29.
An Arizona-California boundary compact provides a fixed boundary to replace
what has been a movable Colorado River boundary, but it expressly leaves private
".
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Various subsidiary reasons for an accretion rule have been stated.
The least persuasive is usually identified with Blackstone: Dc
minimis non curat lex."46 The 175 feet added by accretion to the
Hughes property since 1889 is not de minimis. Nevertheless, something can be said for Blackstone's reason. As of 1890, the addition
was doubtless small. A six-inch strip separating a substantial tract
from the water has no more than nuisance value-a detriment to an
upland owner without concomitant benefit to the tideland owner,
whether the state or its vendee. If six inches is de minimis, when does
de minimis cease to be applicable?
Another reason for an accretion rule, recognized by Blackstone,14 7
is that because the upland owner must sustain the loss from erosion or
the costs of its prevention, he should have the benefit of any accretion.
That an upland owner's boundary may be legally fixed against movement by erosion is only a partial answer. Even if one's ownership continues after the sea has claimed his land, the sea is nonetheless a destroyer. Moreover, the navigational servitude of the United States
renders "ownership" of tide and submerged lands in some situations
relatively meaningless. 148
titles and water rights unaffected by the change of land from one state to another.
Nor does the compact purport to displace the effect of future accretion on private
titles. See Arizona Laws 1963, ch. 77; CAL. GOVT CODE § 176; Cal. Stats. 1963 ch.
859. The compact was approved by Congress August 11, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-531, 80
Stat. 340.
Contrast Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963), where the same distinction between
accretion or avulsion determined both private boundary and the territorial boundary
of the state, and hence jurisdiction of a state court. The Supreme Court held that the
Nebraska court's determination of its own jurisdiction, which also determined the
merits, was res judicata. Mr. Justice Black separately concurred, stating his understanding that the Supreme Court did not thereby decide the continuing effect of the
Nebraska judgment should the United States Supreme Court or an interstate compact
later establish that the disputed land was in Missouri.
1402 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262 (Lewis ed. 1898):
And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of
sand and earth, so as in time to make terrafirma; or by dereliction, as when the
sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held to be,
that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it
shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de mininis non curat lex; and,
besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea. or at
charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration
for such possible charge or loss. But if the alluvion or dereliction be sudden and
considerable, in this case it belongs to the king; for, as the king is lord of the
sea, and so owner of the soil while it is covered with water, it is but reasonable
he should have the soil when the water has left it dry.
'Ibid. To the same effect is Mayor, Aldermen, and Inhabitants of New Orleans
v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 717 (1836) :
Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded, is subject to loss, by the same means
which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this
way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain.
141 See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: the Navigation Power and the
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1963).
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This reason is more persuasive when applied to rivers, which move
back and forth across a flood plain, than to tidelands. On the ocean
shores, accretion or erosion is more likely to be a long-continued and
one-way process.14 It is not a compelling argument that McGillicuddy,
whose land is located where accretion continues over centuries, should
own those accretions because Jones, whose land is located where erosion is an equally uninterrupted process, is losing his real estate.
A more persuasive reason for an accretion rule is related to the difficulties of proof. Gradual and unnoticed movement of a water line
leaves few traces in memory and even fewer enduring records. To
establish where a boundary was located in 1889, even if a litigant
wins, may be an expensive process. A less expensive rule both for
litigants and the state, which provides the courts, is one which declares
that the boundary is where the water line now exists-unless someone
can establish that (a) the boundary used to be somewhere else, and
(b) an avulsive change took place.150
Doubtless the most important consideration favoring an accretion
rule is access to the water. 5 ' The dissenting opinion in Hughes persuasively points out that contact with the line of mean high tide "in
many instances, may have been the reason for the acquisition of the
property.' 5 2- Language reflects the usual importance of access when a
water line or body of water is described as "in front of" and not "behind" the upland."'
Considerations of access to the water have less weight in Washington
than elsewhere. The Washington court early established' 4 that the
upland owner has no right of access to navigable water. Lack of a
vested right to access, however, is not alone a persuasive basis for
rejecting an accretion rule. "Vested rights" is merely a label for a
legal conclusion. Even though we accept a conclusion that there are
..2 SHALowlTz, SHOaRE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 359 (1964), declares that there are
coastal regions, often lying between localities of erosion and localities of accretion,
where the two phenomena alternate.
" See Sartori v. Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co., 77 Wash. 166, 167-68, 137 Pac.
494, 495 (1913). Difficulties of proof are encountered whether a shift has been accomplished by accretion or avulsion. A presumption in favor of a present water line
solves a part of the problem.
" See Lamprey ,. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139, 1142 (1893), quoted in State
v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 169-70, 135 Pac. 1035, 1039 (1913).
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 807, 410 P.2d at 32.
IE3E.g., WASH. CONsT. art. XV, § 1, providing for harbor lines to be established
in navigable waters "within or in front of" city limits, and making related lands
inalienable.
"' Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (1891) ; power of the state court
to so decide was approved in Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. RtR., 255 U.S. 56
(1921).
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no vested rights, there may still be strong reason to protect expectations which are not vested. 55
Access to water has been recognized in Washington law as an important although not a vested right. The upland owner is given a preferential right to buy shore and tidelands when the state disposes of
them." 6 This right was provided by the legislature "to compensate,
in some degree, the owner for the loss of the riparian right."' "7
Authority from the common law and from other states heavily favors
an accretion rule.' The dissenting opinion in Hughes quotes this concession from the Attorney General's brief: "It is a rare occurrence, of
course, when a state denies a riparian owner title to tidelands that
have become fast lands by slow and imperceptible accretion, but at
least two other states have done so.""' 9
The authority claimed for a fixed boundary must be discounted at
least fifty percent. One of the two states is California, which in fact
follows an accretion rule. 60 The other is Louisiana, which recognizes
the accretion rule as to rivers (including tidal rivers) but not as to lakes
or the ocean. The Louisiana rule, however, is based on the Code
Napoleon which provides a fixed boundary for the ocean upland and
has been construed to cover lakes.' 6 '
I Illinois Cent. P-R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), may be cited for the vague
but nevertheless reasonable proposition that vested rights in tide, shore, and submerged lands are never as vested as rights in lands wholly above water. The state of
Illinois legislatively granted lands underlying the Chicago harbor to the railroad in
1869 and took them back in 1873. The decision was four to three, and hedged by limitations not much clearer today than in 1892, but the notion expressed in Ju;t;ce
Field's opinion for the Court is that a state may not irrevocably abdicate its governmental interest in the land subject to a public trust. But cf. Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash.
227, 149 Pac. 951 (1915). The limits of such a proposition cannot be tested until the
state legislatively seeks to take back that which it has granted.
'WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 79.01.448, .484 (1958).
-1 State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash. 158, 164, 135 Pac. 1035, 1037 (1913).
' See 3 AMERcAN LAv oF PRoPERTY §§ 15.26-.33 (Casner ed. 1952); PAvTON,
TITLEs §§ 300-05 (1957) ; 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 983-86 (1965); 4 TIFFANY,
REAL. PROPERTY §§ 1219-29 (1939).
1 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 805, 410 P.2d at 30-31, quoting Brief of Appellant, p.36.
i Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 161 Pac. 975
(1916).
The Attorney General relied on Western Pac. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 151 Fed.
376 (9th Cir. 1907), which construed CAL. Civ. CODE § 1014 (accretion rule applicable
to "river or stream") to confine the accretion rule to inland waters. That decision
still stands as the federal court's judgment that such a statute would be constitutional.
However, the Strand case, supra, subsequently held that the accretion rule applies to
ocean boundaries by virtue of California's statutory adoption of the common law.
Washington's adoption of the common law precedes statehood and is incorporated,
as modified, in WASH. REv. CODE § 4.04.010 (1956). The statute does not appear to
have been argued as a basis for Mrs. Hughes' claim to the accretion land.
... Zeller v. Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837 (1882), is the Attorney General's other
case. Construing the Louisiana code, based on the Code Napoleon, it held that a lake
has a fixed boundary, like the upland-seashore boundary. This imported into Louisiana law a difficult problem: what is a lake? See State v. Cockrell, 162 So. 2d 361
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B. Bases of the Rule Adopted in Hughes
The Hughes opinion does not deal with the policy considerations
which have supported an accretion rule. Nor does it advance the
opposing arguments which can be made in favor of a fixed boundary.
These rest on the inconvenience and uncertainty of a boundary which
is subject to the vagaries of nature, an ownership which natural forces
may totally destroy."' Rather, the court explores a number of sources
of law, some of which lend support to its conclusion and some of which
do not.
These are the sources explored:
1. The Words of the Washington Constitution. The constitutional
words are "the line of ordinary high tide, where the tide ebbs and
flows." They do not say either 1889, as the state successfully contended on appeal, nor do they say "as it exists at any particular time,"
as the trial judge held. On their face, however, they tend to support the
trial judge's decision. They are common law words. When not defined
they should be given a common law meaning, unless an affirmative
reason for some other meaning can be discovered." 3
2. History of the Constitution's Adoption. The court recited at
length the absorbing history of the constitutional convention, and the
(La. Cir. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 343, 164 So. 2d 350 (1964) ; Note, 39
TUL. L. REv. 611 (1965) ; Note, Alluvion and Dereliction in Lakes, 7 TUL. L.
Rnv. 438 (1933).
The Roman law, the Civil law, Louisiana law, the Spanish law, and th2 Code
Napoleon are all explored in Justice Holmes' opinion in Ker & Co. v. Couden, 223 U.S.
263 (1912). He concluded that accretion does not apply to the ocean in the Philippines. Justice McKenna dissented on the basis of an accretion rule founded on natural justice. Id. at 279.
"'The dissenting opinion of Judge Mark A. Fullerton in Williams Fishing Co.
v. Savidge, 155 Wash. 443, 450, 454-55, 284 Pac. 744, 746, 748 (1930), stated the case
for certainty of a fixed line but did not face up to the hazard in that alternative:
The purchaser may have acquired, at the time of his purchase, one tract of land,
and now, by the action of the elements be the owner of an entirely different tract,
or he may have had a valuable property at the time of his purchase and now have
nothing of which he can devote to his private use. This was not the purpose of
the constitutional reservation. It was intended to vest in the state title in fee to
the tide and shore lands as they existed at the time of the reservation, and the
state or its grantees owns them in fee, and the title to the specific tract is not
changed by accretions or diminutions.
The initial decision in the case is reported at 152 Wash. 165, 277 Pac. 459 (1929).
The final decision, which determined that Peacock Spit off the mouth of the Columbia River is capable of becoming part of and ceasing to be part of the mainland by
accretion-like natural processes, is reported at 164 Wash. 50, 2 P.2d 722 (1931).
The Washington-Oregon Columbia River boundary is movable. Washington v.
Oregon, 211 U.S. 127 (1908). An interstate compact approved by the Washington
Legislature would give this boundary a fixed location. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.58.050
(1965). Compare the Arizona-California Compact, note 145 supra.
'" See Fransen v. Board of Natural Resources, 66 Wn. 2d 672, 674-75, 404 P.2d 432,
433 (1965), for a recent expression of this nrincip!e apolied t) statutory construction.
The adoption by Washington Territory of the common law, and contemporaneous
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controversies over tide and shore lands. So far as the opinion discloses,
however, and so far as can be discovered from the materials cited by
the court, those controversies did not revolve around the question
whether the line of ordinary high tide was to be fixed as of 1889.
Two indicators, neither very strong, point to recognition of a moving
boundary rule by the framers. The constitutional convention was
advised" 4 of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Barney v. Keokuk." 5 The decision had made clear prior to (1889)
(a) that an accretion rule is generally followed in locating the high
water line, and (b) inferentially that each state may decide for itself the
applicability of such a rule. The convention, having used common law
language, should have anticipated a common law result.
A second indicator touched on, but not evaluated, by the court is
the concern of the early Washington legislatures with oyster beds.'(
Although the court might have judicially noticed that oysters cannot
be grown in 1966 on what was tide or submerged land in 1889, but has
since become upland by reason of accretions, it did not.
Finally, negative evidence is persuasive. If the constitution had
declared in 1889 that the state claimed property to the line of vegetation as it existed on the date of statehood, there would have been a
great scurry to preserve records of the location of that line. There is
in fact no indication that either Mrs. Hughes' predecessor, or anyone
else similarly situated, had cause to feel that November 11, 1889, had
produced a great legal change in the definition of the upland boundary.
The evidence in Samson Johns indicates that the Commissioner of
Public Lands undertakes to find out where the 1889 boundary was
located only when an occasion arises on which someone needs to
167
know.
3. Court Decisions: Gkione v. State. The Washington Supreme
Court labels the concluding section of its opinion "Court decisions."
To the most significant of these it gives the least attention.
In 1946, Ghione v. State adopted the moving boundary rule in a
comprehensive opinion by Judge William J. Steinert.'0 5 The court
reenactment of that adoption in 1891, VWrash. Sess. Laws 1891, ch. 17, might be treated
as an additional reason for reading the accretion rule into the Washington constitution. See note 160 supra.
' JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

1889, at 813

(Rosenow ed. 1962). The court cites to pages 809 et seq. of the Journal, 67 Wash.
Dec. 2d at 792, 410 P.2d at 23.
' 94 U.S. 324 (1877).
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 793, 410 P.2d at 24, citing Wash. Sess. Laws 1891, at 366.
' See testimony of Frank 0. Sether quoted in text accompanying note 66 supra.
x 26 Wn. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946). The state claimed both the original bed of
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denied the state's claim to accretion lands on two navigable but nontidal rivers. The course of one had been changed artificially; the
other had ceased to flow when construction of the ship canal lowered
Lake Washington in 1915.
The court in Hughes concedes that "read without reference to the
particular facts before the court," Ghione seems to lend weight to
respondent's argument in support of the [trial court's] judgment."16' 9
However, the court then says: "We have no quarrel with the decision
as applied to the facts; we do not, however, deem it controlling of the
instant case.' 7

Ghione held that the "line of ordinary high water

within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes," referred to in the
Washington Constitution,'7 ' is a line which moves with accretion. 7 2
The court in Hughes held that "the line of ordinary high tide, in
waters where the tide ebbs and flows," words found in the same
sentence of the constitution, means a line fixed in location as of 1889.
The court in Ghione stated that the moving boundary rule applies to
all navigable watersY.3 The Hughes opinion suggests no reason,
rational or otherwise, for a distinction. The absence of any stated
reason leaves doubt whether the Hughes holding can be limited to
tideland boundaries.
The dissenting opinion says that the Hughes court "seeks to distinguish the Gkione case because it involved a river.'

7

4

Maybe this is

the distinction the majority had in mind when it said "facts," but
several other facts might conceivably be involved-for example, that
the river had been dried up when the Lake Washington ship canal
substituted a new outlet for Lake Washington.
A rational distinction between Hughes and Ghione would require
some articulated reason for applying a movable boundary rule to
inland waters and a fixed boundary rule to tidal waters. An even more
useful distinction would provide some basis for future decisions to
determine, for boundary purposes, which waters are inland and which
are tidal.1 7 4a The court's failure to distinguish Ghione except on "its
the rivers and the bed to which they had moved, an extreme position which invited

judicial rejection.
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29.
'~' 1 Ibid.
WVAsH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
26 Wn. 2d at 651, 175 P.2d at 965.
" 26 NWn. 2d at 645, 175 P.2d at 961.
17467 Wash. Dec. 2d at 808, 410 P2d at 32.
7, Wash. Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 255, § 141, at 547, provides:
The commissioner of public lands is hereby authorized to locate in all navigable

rivers in this state, which are subject to tidal flow, the line dividing the tide lands
in such river from the shore lands in such river and such classification or the
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facts," and the absence of any discoverable reason for distinction,
17
leaves an unanswerable question: Did Hughes overrule Ghione? 5
This kind of opinion writing ignores the reason that opinions are
published: to advise judges, lawyers, and all who rely on the advice
of lawyers what the law is. The uncertainty with respect to Ghione
is particularly unfortunate because it applies to real property titles,
where reliance on precedent is more important than in most other areas
of the law.
4. Court Decisions: Pre-Ghione. The court invoked three preGhione decisions in support of its conclusion that the tidal upland
boundary became fixed in 1889:176 Eisenbach v. Hatfield,177 Harbor
& LaCamas
Line Conmn'rs v. State ex rel. Yesler; 17' and Washougal
79
Transp. Co. v. Dalles, Portland& Astoria Nay. Co.1
The first two cases were decided within two years of statehood.
Both are entitled, as the court said, to consideration as contemporaneous constructions of the then newly adopted state constitution. However, neither decision purported to decide the accretion issue presented
in Hughes. They both provided a step in the rationale for Hughes, but
a far shorter step than the stride taken in Hughes.
Eisenbach disposed of a claim to the exclusive use of tideland
fronting the claimant's upland property on the ground that there are
no riparian rights in navigable waters attaching to upland ownership."' As to the claimed right to future accretions, the court said:
location of such dividing line shall be final and not subject to review, and the
commissioner shall enter the location of said line upon the plat of the tide and
shore lands affected.
Query whether this statute provides adequate standards for constitutional purposes to
guide the commissioner in locating the line between tide and shore lands, and if so
whether it confers upon the commissioner a power to make that determination for a
purpose unforeseen and unforeseeable in 1927: to determine the line between lands
subject to the Ghione moving boundary and the Hughes fixed boundary, both of which
derive from article XVII, § 1 of the Constitution of 1889?
'1There is reason to inquire: Could Hughes overrule Ghione, since whatever
Hughes might have said about inland waters and what Ghione did say about tidal
waters is in each instance dictum? This is a semantic quiddity involving definitions of "overrule" and "dictum." Ghione usefully indicated the ambit of that decision when it said it applies to both inland and tidal waters. Hughes casts doubt
about the rule applicable to inland waters, but provides no basis even for conjccturc
on how that doubt may be resolved.
Query if the applicability of the Ghione rule to tide waters is appropriately described as dictum until a basis of distinction can be discovered. Certainly a decision
applicable to the River Black is not dictum as to the River White unless a basis for
distinction between the two rivers, other than their names, can be discovered.
27667 Wash. Dec. 2d at 801-02, 410 P.2d at 27-29.
'2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539 (1891).
'r2 Wash. 530, 27 Pac. 550 (1891).
' 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 74 (1902).
1.

2 Wash. at 249, 26 Pac. at 542.

WHERE DOES THE BEACH BEGIN

1966]

"We are unable to see how one can have a present vested right to that
which does not exist, and which may never have an existence."'' The
holding, most broadly stated, is the denial of a vested right to future
accretions. Hughes and Ghione both required decision on the right
to existing accretions."8 2
The rationale of the Hughes decision, insofar as it is based on
Eisenbach, goes like this:
Major premise: Upland ownership carries no riparian rights in
navigable waters.
Minor premise: The right to accretions is a riparian right. (And
8 3
the burden of erosion a "riparian burden"?)
Conclusion: Upland owners have no right to accretions in navigable
waters.
Metaphysical distinctions can be drawn in defining "vested
right."'8 4 The words have no fixed meaning independent of their
context. The same is true of "riparian right." Concepts may be
necessary, but the concept labelled "riparian rights" is too broad to
be practically useful to resolve the accretion issue.' 85
'1
Id. at 250, 26 Pac. at 543.
2
" The breadth of the distinction between what the court decided in Eisenbach and
what it decided in Hughes is demonstrated by the Eisenbach court's quotation, 2
Wash. at 250, 26 Pac. at 543, from Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471, 473-74 (1871) :
77iplaintiff, as a riparian owner, has also a right to accretions to his land, and
it is said that the claim of defendant will be a cloud upon his title to such accretions. But, as yet, there is no such property, and there may never be. He cannot ask
the court to interfere in advance, and prevent a cloud being cast upon his title to
that which may never have ["had" as quoted] an existence. [Emphasis added.]
The Eisenbach court describes this as a "more reasonable doctrine" than that of
County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874), which declared
that "the riparian right to future alluvion is a vested right.' We add our own italics
to that portion of the Taylor v. Underhill quotation which is diametrically opposite
to the holding in Hughes.
" In 1915, the Washington court wrote in Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 230, 149
Pac. 951, 952 (1915):
This court held in the case of Eisenbach v. Hatfield [citation] that the state's title
to the beds and shores of navigable lakes and streams is paramount and absolute,
and that an abutting owner has no riparian or littoral right in the waters and
shores of the stream.... The riparian right is a right to the use and accustomed
flow of water. It is not a right in the bed of a stream unless new land results from
accretion,reliction or avulsion. [Emphasis added.]
See note 155 supra.

'*

It may be useful in shelving books, or in preparing chapter headings, to classify
questions about rights to consume water, to pollute it, to swim, to fish, and to boat,
with questions about ownership of land beneath navigable water. The questions are
related. However, a doctrine which makes it impossible to answer a question about
the right to consume water without necessarily answering a question about title to
land beneath navigable water, or vice versa, is a monster of unreason.
Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streanms, 35 WASH. L. REv. 580
(1960), demonstrates that generalization about "riparian rights" in Washington does
r1-t and should not dispose of the problems to which the generalization has been applied.
'
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Harbor Line Comm'rs v. State'8 6 decided in the same year as
Eisenback, merely reaffirmed the conclusion that there are no riparian
rights attaching to upland ownership.
The court found more solid authority in the third decision: Washou8 7
gal & LaCamas Transp. Co. v. Dalles, Portland& Astoria Nay. Co.
Plaintiff sued to remove a cloud from title to property on the Columbia
River, claiming under a deed from the State of Washington granting it
"shore land" described as "in front of, adjacent to, or abutting" a
described federal meander line. Defendant claimed, under a donation
patent from the United States of 1865, to the low-water mark. The
meander line had been run above the line of high water because the
bank had been perpendicular. Plaintiff prevailed in the trial court on
the basis that the meander line was the upper boundary of the shore
land.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. High-water mark is the
boundary, although the meander line may be "presumptive evidence"
of the high-water mark. Since the meander line was above the highwater mark, the Washington rule that the meander line is the boundary
of upland patented prior to statehood if below the high-water line was
inapplicable.
The plaintiff also had an accretion claim:'8 8
It is not only shown that the meander line was originally run, if run at
the place the trial court found it to be, above the line of high-water mark,
but it is shown, as we have said, by uncontradicted evidence, that originally there were no shore lands at this point; that the line of high and
low-water marks were practically coincident, differing only with the
rise and fall of the river upon a perpendicular bank; and that such shore
lands as may appear at that point now were caused in part by the erosion
of the banks, and in part by the debris caught and held by the piling
driven in constructing the old wharf erected by the appellant's grantors.
This being true, the state had nothing at this place it could pass by a deed
purporting to convey shore lands. It cannot be that shore lands created
by the erosion of the banks of a stream within the boundaries of a private
claim inure to the benefit of the state; nor can the state clain, as shore
lands, fills in a river caused by artificial mieans.
The Hughes court quotes the emphasized portion of the passage just
quoted."" It is the only prior holding in Washington which supports
its decision. We find it puzzling because of the words which introduce
2 Wash. 530, 27 Pac. 550 (1891).
' 27 Wash. 490, 68 Pac. 74 (1902).
Id. at 499, 68 Pac. at 77. (Emphasis added.)
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 802, 410 P2d at 29.

's
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the sentence just before that quoted in Hughes: "This being true ......
How much of the earlier recital is embraced by "this"? Vertical bank?
Erosion artificially caused?
Conceivably, the fixed boundary rule stated was broader than
Hughes because the old wharf had been built in 1880,' ° nine years
before statehood. The bank may have lost its perpendicular character
before 1889. Did the boundary become fixed against erosion even
prior to statehood?
It would appear, in any event, that the language quoted in Hughes
is contrary to the results under a usual accretion rule, unless the
court intended to state a rule applicable only where changes had been
artificially caused. The state owns the bed below the shore which is
alternately covered and uncovered by water. Normally, erosion
would-contrary to what the Washougal court said-enlarge the state's
ownership.
Ghione did not cite Washougal. It is interesting that the Attorney
General cited Washougal to the Ghione court,19 ' but not on the movable boundary issue. Certainly Washougal is obscure. It devotes only
the passage quoted to the accretion problem, cites no authority, and
gives the issue none of the consideration to be expected in a case which
set Washington law on a course different from that followed by most
other states.'9 2
Perhaps the most significant fact about Hughes' reliance on Washougal is that both Washougal and Ghione applied to rivers. In attempting
to follow Washougal and distinguish Ghione, the Washington court
attempted the impossible. These irreconcilables cannot-on this
basis- be reconciled.
5. "Tideland Statutes Subsequent to Statehood in 1889." Under
this heading,"9a the court treats statutes enacted in 1899, 1901, and
1929, very much as if its problem were one of statutory construction.
However, the relevance of these statutes to construction of the constitution of 1889 is not expressly considered. The Washington legislature,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, could not
in 1899 or at any later date have determined retroactively that accretions formed since 1889 belonged to the state. Thus, the statutes are
27 Wash. at 495, 68 Pac. at 76.
Brief of Respondent, p. 18, Ghione v. State, 26 Wn. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
Interestingly, authority cited by the TllWashouga! court, 27 Wash. at 497, 68 Pac.
at 77, on the effect of federal meander lines includes Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co.,
134 U.S. 178 (1890), a leading case for an accretion rule.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 793, 410 P.2d at 24.
''
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relevant at most as a legislative, and sometimes contemporaneous,
construction of the constitution on an issue not within the legislature's
jurisdiction.
a. The statute of 1899.'
The court identifies this statute, enacted
ten years after statehood, as "the first legislative recognition of accretion to tidelands."' 5 In its current form, clarified but not substantively amended, this statute provides: "'
Any accretions that may be added to any tract or tracts of tide or shore
lands heretofore sold or that may hereafter be sold, by the state, shall
belong to the state and shall not be sold or offered for sale until
such accretions shall have been first surveyed under the direction of the
commissioner of public lands, and the owner of the adjacent tide or shore
lands shall have the preference right to purchase said lands produced by
accretion for thirty days after the owner of the adjacent tide or shore
lands shall be notified by registered mail of his preference right to purchase such accreted lands.
Since the statute deals with accretions added to the water side of
tide and shore lands,197 it does not apply to the accretion lands
involved in Hughes. Furthermore, the statute applies only when the
state sells or has sold tide or shore lands. No such sale had been made
in the Hughes case. Sales in that county have been forbidden since
1901.198

The Hughes opinion rejects neither of the foregoing constructions
of the 1899 statute, both of which were made in the Ghione opinion, 9 '
but it adds this exegesis:200
We do not construe the statute in any sense to be a waiver by the state of
its interest in tidelands. It is more logical to conclude that this is a legislative recognition of the state's claim to all accretion after 1889 whether
the tidelands be sold or not. The statute is at least indicative of the legislative intent to claim accretion for the state under the limited circumstances identified.
In other words, the statute is inconsistent with a notion that ownership
. Wash. Sess. Laws 1899, ch. 83.
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 793, 410 P.2d at 24.
"WASH.
REV. CODE § 79.01.492 (1956). The opinion quotes from the statute as enacted, Wash. Sess. Laws 1899, ch. 83, noting that reenactment made "a few minor
changes" in the original.
"See Strand v. State, 16 Wn. 2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943) ; Ghione v. State, 26
Wn. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 110; Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 78.
"126 Wn. 2d at 650-51, 175 P.2d at 964-65. The Ghione court followed Strand v.
State, 16 Wn. 2d 107, 129-30, 132 P.2d 1011, 1021 (1943), in declaring that the statute
applies to accretion which occurs only after the state has deeded tide or shore lands.
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 794, 410 P.2d at 24.
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of accretion lands automatically follows the ownership of the lands to
which the accretion is added. 10'
b. Public highway dedication statutes of 1901."' In 1901, the legislature in two separate statutes provided that two specified reaches of
beach along the Pacific Ocean, including Pacific County where the
Hughes property is located, should be a public highway forever open to
the use of the public. "Highway," as the Hughes opinion points out, is
not used to mean a road for automobile traffic, but a recreational area. 0- 3
The beach so dedicated is "between ordinary high tide and extreme
low tide (as such shore and beach now are or hereafter may be).""4

On their face, these 1901 statutes appear to recognize the accretion
rule, and much more clearly than the 1899 statute may have denied
it. The words "ordinary high tide" are used in both the 1901 statutes
and the constitution of 1889 to describe a boundary. The 1901 statute
is express that the boundary these words describe is a movable line:
"as such shore and beach now are or hereafter may be."
The court in Hughes, however, says that although the line described
in the statute is movable, that line is not the line described in the
constitution: 2 5 "The statute declares certain shore and tidelands a
'public highway forever.' It does not purport to reserve all stateowned tideland in the vicinity as a public highway." In other words,
"ordinary high tide" in the 1901 statutes and "ordinary high tide" in
the 1889 constitution mean different things: the statutes use the words
to describe a movable line, and the constitution uses them to describe
a fixed line. Different meanings of identical words are quite possible,
S"Obenour, Water Boundaries, Tide and Shore Land Rights, 23 WASH. L. REv.
235, 244-45 (1948), calls this statute "the principal stumbling block to the solution of
conflicting interests of waterfront property," and suggests that it may be unconstitutional. An upland boundary fixed as of 1889, and tide and shore lands with riparian
rights, including the right to accretion (reversing Ghione but anticipating Hughes)
would, he urges, protect property owners against all but the risks of erosion. Id. at
251-53. Mr. Obenour's work is a useful attempt to find a consistent rationale for law
that has developed from piecemeal and somewhat random decisions. The "stumbling
block" statute has received judicial attention only in cases which declare situations
to which it does not apply, and in Hughes which finds it a source of principle of
much wider application than the statute's terms.
"Wash. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 105, applies to the Pacific Ocean from Grays Harbor
north to the mouth of the Queets River. Wash. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 110, applies to the
area from Grays Harbor to the Columbia River. The former is partially codified in
WASH. REv. CODE § 79.16.160 (1956), the latter in WAsH. REv. CODE § 79.16.170
(1956). In 1935, the dedication was extended north from the Queets River to Cape
Flattery. Wash. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 54. This is partially codified in WAsH. REv.
CODE § 79.16.130 (1956).
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 795 n.14, 410 P.2d at 24 n.14.
' The 1935 statute said merely "tidelands along the shore and beach," omitting the
words "as such shore and beach now or hereafter may be," which appeared in the

1901 enactment. WASH. REV. CODE § 79.16.130 (1956).
'5 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 795, 410 P.2d at 24. (Emphasis in original.)
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but it is extraordinary to find a statute so construed used to arrive at
a construction of a constitution.
c. The 1929 authorization to sell accretion lands.20 6 In 1929, the
legislature authorized the Commissioner of Public Lands to sell land
"lying above and on the land side of the highway reservations" established in the 1901 statutes.0 7 The statute did not apply to land in
Pacific County, where the Hughes property is situated, but it provides
an indication of what the legislature in 1929 may have thought the
1901 legislature meant when it used the words "ordinary high tide"
to describe the boundary of the dedicated beach.
If "ordinary high tide" in both the constitution and the 1901 statutes
is a movable line, there is no tideland belonging to the state "on the
land side of the highway reservations." And the Commissioner of
Public Lands had sold some."s The dilemma is resolved by the court's
construction which gives "ordinary high tide" two different meanings:
a fixed line in the constitution, a moving line in the 1901 statute.
This leaves the Commissioner with some accretion lands to sell.
The dissenting opinion discloses an unfortunate consequence of the
court's construction. 0 0 That construction, wherever the coast is eroding, defeats the purpose of the 1901 dedication-to reserve to the
public the beach wherever it may be located. If the landward boundary
of the state's tideland is fixed by the constitutional provision, as
Hughes holds, but the landward boundary of the dedicated highway
moves inland with erosion, the beach will come to be located in an
area which the state does not own and cannot dedicate to the public.
The dissent describes the result:2 10 "Under the majority rule, the
upland owner would continue to have title to the 1889 line, and the
public, seemingly, would have to swim to enjoy its 'highway' and
beach rights."
Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 78.
Background of the 1929 act is apparently contained in an Attorney General',
opinion in 1928 to the Prosecuting Attorney of Grays Harbor County, who had asked
what to do about shacks occupied by clam diggers, beachcombers, moonshiners, and
other undesirables in the accretion land consisting of waste sands formed by jetties
at Grays Harbor. The Attorney General said this was all included in the "public
highway" dedication, but could be abated as a public nuisance. 1927-1928 OPs. WASH.
Ar-'y GEN. 779. The Attorney General's brief in Hughes says that the statute was
a legislative response to this problem. Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-22.
See Brief for Appellant, pp. 20-21:
From 1929 to 1959 the State of Washington delivered over a hundred deeds under
this enactment.... The greatest portion of the accreted lands from the north entrance to Grays Harbor to the Copalis River has been sold. Approximately 60 sales
have been made in the Grayland area, south of the entrance to Grays Harbor.
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 808, 410 P.2d at 32.
210
Ibid.
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Questions of construction of these statutes need detain us no longer.
They reveal the absence of a clear and consistent purpose or principle
entitled to receive weight as a legislative construction.21' The Washington legislature could not in 1899, 1901 or 1929 have validly enacted:
"The line of ordinary high tide referred to by Article XVII Section 1
of the Constitution of this State shall mean .... " Why should evidence
of a confused and inconsistent legislative understanding of the constitution receive greater weight? The primary judicial function is to insure
that statutes conform to the constitution, not to shape the constitution
to conform to statutes.
6. "Administrative and Superior Court Interpretations"-A New
Source of Law. This is another caption borrowed from the Hughes
opinion.2 12 The court says that the Commissioner of Public Lands
has established that the boundary between upland property and stateowned land is "the line of ordinary high tide where it existed November 11, 1889." The court also recites that "over the years, 73 lawsuits
affecting 322 private ownerships have been instituted against the state
to establish this boundary. 2 1 3 None was appealed. All awarded the
accreted lands to the state. The superior court judgments establish
"a rule of property which has been relied upon and applied on many
occasions when the state has sold tidelands pursuant to statutory
authority."
We have been surprised to learn that "over the years" includes
only years since the Ghione decision. The Land Commissioner's survey
which the seventy-three judgments confirm to be the boundary also
occurred after Ghione. Gkione did not overlook the superior court
judgments. Rather the Land Commissioner and the superior court
apparently overlooked or disregarded Ghione.
The Washington Supreme Court in 1966 follows the Commissioner
and the seventy-three superior court decisions in preference to Ghione.
In doing so, it adds nothing to the credibility of its own past or future
' The court quotes, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 796 n.15, 410 P2d at 25 n.15, from a 1963
statute (Wash. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 212) which it believes to be "the first legislative
use of the terms 'line of vegetation' and 'mean high tide' as distinguished from 'ordinary high tide"':
[T]hat portion of the public highway established by Laws of 1901, chapters 105 and
110 "lying between the line of vegetation and the line of mean high tide, as such
lines now are or may hereafter be, is hereby declared a public recreations area and
is hereby set aside and forever reserved for the use of the public." [Emphasis supplied by the court.]
On its face, the statute does not do much to clarify the moving boundary issue.
1267 Wash. Dec. 2d at 798, 410 P.2d at 26.
'13

Id at 798-99, 410 P.2d at 26.
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pronouncements about the law of Washington. It adds to the uncertainty of lawyers who must rely upon reported decisions of the Washington Supreme Court to advise clients about the law. Who can say
what surprises may still lurk in unreported decisions which will consti214
tute tomorrow's rule of property?
The seventy-three unappealed judgments are res judicata, fixing
the rights of the parties without regard to the Hughes decision. Hughes
is unnecessary to protect a reliance interest of the parties. Perhaps
there is a reliance interest by others not parties to the judgments, 1 '
but the court gives us no basis on which to answer that question. In
any event, a rule of property should arise only from justifiable reliance.
After Ghione in 1946 declared a moving boundary rule applicable to
all navigable waters, reliance on a fixed boundary rule can hardly be
called justifiable.
"14
Perhaps not a surprise, but nevertheless of substantial interest are judgments of
the superior court of Grays Harbor County determining that the seaward boundary of
accretion land sold pursuant to Chapter 78 of the 1929 laws is "a moving boundary
which is the line of ordinary high tide as it now exists or may hereafter be." E.g.,
Rohr v. Gordon, No. 49,113, Superior Court for Grays Harbor County, described as
"Judgment between Plaintiffs and State of Washington, October 6, 1958." We have
been told that this is a construction by the Commissioner of Public Lands and the
Attorney General for all such classes of conveyance.
-'Counsel for Mrs. Hughes explains the judgments in his brief to the Washington
Supreme Court as follows:
Counsel for respondent has represented plaintiffs in many of these actions and the
westward location of these boundary lines in these instances was not as important
as having a definite line wherever it may be. In past years water frontage in this
area did not have sufficient value to justify appeals through the Washington courts
and through the federal courts. None of these cases with two exceptions were adversary in character.
Brief for Respondent, p. 8. Judge Warner Poyhonen, who rendered the decision for
Mrs. Hughes in the trial court, describes two of the judgments:
One of the Superior Court cases in the exhibit is one of mine out of Grays Harbor
County in '58. That is the Sunshine Mining Co. vs. Union Gas Development. I
don't know if it is particular in point. I think all I had to do was decide where
the line of vegetation had been on a certain date because under state law, title
rested on the state permit and it was a factual question and neither party in that
litigation was questioning the state's right or title or could they by reason of
whatever rights they had, rested on those permits. I watched with considerable
interest the Ocean Shores development. The lawsuit in Minard quiet title action
involved several miles of ocean front. That didn't come before me. It was settled.
Of course, that Superior Court decision established ownership in the State of
Washington. I have never felt it was truly an adversary proceedings. What
Minard did-he brought a lawsuit. I think part of the proceedings there was an
effort to shut out some squatters out there, who probably had good title by adverse
possession if Minard was owner of the property and probably had no rights if the
land belonged to the State during all of those years. I don't want to go into the
merits except this comment, if Minard owned the property actually, probably it
wasn't a bad deal for him. Litigation through the Supreme Court of the United
States might have cost him a lot of money. If there wasn't any question about the
state's ownership, then it was state property beyond all question and the propriety
of a sale of several miles of beach for $40,000 might be open to question.
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Supreme Court of the United States,
pp. 30-31. Judge Poyhonen's decision was based on Borax.
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C. How Can the Vegetation Line of 1889 Be Discovered?
The major problem in the Hughes case is not touched in the opinion.
Based on the state constitution, the court declared a rule applicable to
the entire state. The upland-tideland boundary is the vegetation line
of 1889. How do we discover-how does anyone discover-where that
line is?
The opinion contains the legal description of a line in front of Mrs.
Hughes' property. 2 0 However, the connection between that line and
the issues discussed in the opinion resembles the relation between the
magician's "abracadabra" and the subsequent emergence of the rabbit
from the silk hat. There is implicit the suggestion that the word
produces the rabbit. But we have not observed the ectoplasm congeal
into a rabbit, and we would not know how to duplicate the event.
We have quoted21 7 Mr. Frank 0. Sether's explanation of the vegetation line which was accepted by the United States District Judge in
Samson Johns. His testimony was clear that the Washington Commissioner frequently determines where the 1889 vegetation line was.
But so far as appears from the printed record (which only excerpts
the actual testimony), Mr. Sether was not asked the crucial question:
How do you find the 1889 line of vegetation? .
A similar question was recently answered by a California official
with similar responsibilities. He said, in effect: You can't get to the
post office from here.
The occasion was a suit not unlike Hughes. The state sued to
enjoin as a public nuisance a line of iron rails adorned by no trespassing signs erected by an upland owner on what the state claimed were
public tidelands. The issue was the upland-tideland boundary. The
trial court granted the relief sought, and declared that the uplandtideland boundary is "the ordinary high water mark of the Pacific
Ocean as it may fluctuate naturally from time to time."21' 8
An intermediate appellate court reversed. Sand deposited during
the summers and washed away during the winters caused the described
line to fluctuate as much as eighty feet annually. Such changes, the
court said, "can hardly be gradual and imperceptible, and thus cannot
meet the definitions of natural accretion and deliction [sic] ."219

The court remanded for a determination of "an average, mean, or
- See note 42 supra.
' Text accompanying note 66 supra.
.s4
People v. William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rep. 215, 217 (1966).
87 supra.
no Id. at 219.

See note
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ordinary line of the shore against which the average plane of the
water at high tide may be placed to determine a reasonably definite
boundary line."'22 The Attorney General of California and the District Attorney of Marin County joined in an unsuccessful petition for
hearing by the California Supreme Court in an endeavor to reverse
the District Court of Appeal. They appended to their petition the
following sworn declaration of the Honorable Francis J. Hortig,
Executive Officer of the California State Lands Commission:
I have broad experience and background in the problems of surveying
coastal boundaries, and my official duties include the general supervision of such surveys throughout the State.
The success of a concept of an "average, mean, or ordinary line of the
shore" would be dependent upon the qualifications that:
1. Adequate records are available over a long period of time to fully
investigate and analyze the history of the shoreline.
2. The shoreline is stable over a long period, and is neither prograding nor retrograding.
3. The shoreline is generally affected only by seasonal changes, and
these changes are relatively uniform.
Adequate records are generally not available to make studies of more
than a small fraction of the California coast. The ability to determine
former shoreline locations is dependent upon the abundance of historical
records, primarily maps. In California, maps showing the shoreline
generally come from:
A. U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (formerly the U.S. Coast Survey).
B. U.S. Geological Survey.
C. Army Map Service.
D. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
E. State and Local governmental agencies.
F. U.S. Bureau of Land Management (formerly the U.S. General
Land Office).
G. Private surveyors.
Reviewing the available maps from these sources for a typical rural
segment of the California coast, it is usually found that only about 4 or 5
maps show a given area of the shoreline, and those would usually come
from sources A, B, and C. It would be fortuitous to obtain useful maps
from sources D through G. The maps thus obtained would be deficient
for the purposes of making the necessary comparative studies primarily
in two ways. One limitation is that they would only show the shoreline
at approximately 20 or 30 year intervals. The other shortcoming is the

accuracy deficiency whereby the actual mean high tide line can be
located with certainty to only within 33 to 100 feet or more of the
2

Id. at 219.
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indicated line. This lack of adequate maps makes it absolutely impossible
to determine whether a beach, over along period of time, is advancing,
retreating or is stable. Often the season of the year is not known for
the background maps, and it is impossible to discern whether variations
in different maps as to the location of the high tide line are caused by
seasonal or long-term changes. Impracticality of fixing a line based upon
a study of a short period of seasonal variations arises from the fact that
many sections of the coast are undergoing long period changes, and in
the absence of artificial corrections could change by several hundred feet
within the next few decades. The available historical maps also usually
show only the position of the mean of all the high waters, and do not
provide the necessary information to permit an interpolation or extrapolation to determine the mean of only the neap tides. It does not
follow, either, that present measurements of the beach profile could be
applied as a correction factor to the old maps for the neap tide determination.
Mr. Hortig, a modest fellow except when duty compels him to be
assertive about his qualifications, may read the Hughes opinion and
infer that his counterpart in the State of Washington is more successful
in reconstructing history than he has been. He will not find from the
opinion, however, any hint of how the job is accomplished.
The unanswered question remains: Can the vegetation line of 1889
in fact be determined? If so, how?
III. THnE SOURCE OF LAW ISSUE
We have thus far considered on their merits the two questions
answered by the Washington Supreme Court when it decided that Mrs.
Stella Hughes' upland boundary, under a title originating in the United
States, is (1) the vegetation line (2) as that line existed on November
11 ,1889. We now reach the third and overriding question: Did the
Washington Supreme Court correctly decide that both answers are to
be derived from construction of the Washington Constitution, a document on which the Washington Supreme Court ordinarily has the last
word? 221
'While the United States Supreme Court may of course declare a provision of
a state constitution federally unconstitutional, it may in limited circumstances
construe a state constitution contrary to the construction by the state's highest
court. It did so in West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951),
reversing a state court's decision which invalidated, on state constitutional grounds,
the state's ratification of an interstate pollution compact. Whatever else may be

said about this technique-and the concurring opinions said quite a bit in criticism

-it

is better than to create a hole in a state's constitution by declaring an essential

provision invalid.
A decision by the United States Supreme Court in Hughes should go no farther
than to hold the Washington constitutional provision unconstitutional as applied,
leaving to the Washington court the first stab at the severability problem: e.g.,
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The present inquiry presents two separate questions since the answer
is not necessarily the same with respect to the vegetation line and accretion issues. A third question is common to both the first two: Is there
a valid ground for distinguishing between federal ownership of the upland and non-federal ownership derived from a federal patent?
It is clear that the vegetation line issue presents a federal question.
Borax, which the court of appeals thought controlled its decision in
Samson Johns, states a proposition from which there can be no dissent:222
The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit
of the land conveyed, or the boundary between the upland and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the
validity and effect of an act done by the United States; it involves the
ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted under federal law.
The boundary at issue in Hughes is a boundary between property
granted by the United States and property owned by the State of
Washington. If the laws of the United States and the laws of Washington conflict on location of that boundary, the supremacy clause resolves the conflict in favor of the federal right. 3 Were the State of
Washington wholly free to decide where the boundary lies, the state
could determine that it lies along the crest of the Cascade Mountains.
Decision that the boundary presents a federal question does not,
however, dispose of the question whether state law generated by the
Washington Supreme Court may be a source of federal law. A unaniwould the Hughes decision remain applicable to establish the upland-tideland
boundary of state school or swamp and overflowed lands conveyed into private ownership, although it is unconstitutional as applied to federally patented upland? Would
an affirmative answer create an unreasonable classification void under the federal
equal protection clause?
A federal ground of decision is suggested by the requirement of the Washington
enabling act that the people "forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated
public lands" within the state. 25 Stat. 676 (1889). In terms, however, the enabling
act does not apply to the Hughes real estate, patented by the United States before
statehood, and hence not, in 1889, "public lands."
22-296 U.S. at 22.

U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.

"Source of law" is a phrase with inherent ambiguity. We use it in the second of
the following contrasting senses:
(1) ".

.

. we find it to be clear that the source of the law governing the relations

between the United States and the parties to the [FHA] mortgage here involved is
federal .... Nevertheless state law is sometimes adopted to fulfil the federal policies
involved." United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F2d 380, 382 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). [Emphasis in original.]
(2) James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARn LEGAL ESASs
213, 221 (1934), urging that statutes of another jurisdiction may be sources of law
sometimes more fruitful than appellate decisions of another jurisdiction. The Landis
article is reprinted in 2 HARV. J. LEGIs. 7 (1965).
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mous Supreme Court of the United States, less than a year prior to
Borax, states this principle :224
The construction of grants by the United States is a federal not a state
question, [citations omitted] and involves the consideration of state questions only insofar as it may be determined as a matter of federal law that
the United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a state rule of
construction as applicable to its conveyances. [Citations omitted.] In
construing a conveyance by the United States of land within a State, the
settled and reasonablerule of construction of the State affords an obvious
guide in determining what impliedly passes to the grantee as an incident
to land expressly granted.

Does the construction of the Washington Constitution presented by
Hughes constitute a "settled and reasonable rule of construction" of
the federal law? Is boundary-vegetation line or mean high tide line"an incident" to the upland granted? Is the fixed or movable character
of the boundary "an incident"?
Answers to these questions should determine whether the Washington
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the vegetation line issue as it
did; they may determine its jurisdiction to decide the accretion issue as
it did. The answers to both issues are not necessarily the same. Furthermore, the questions are not necessarily pertinent to the accretion
issue. Where the United States has parted with all its interest in land
before statehood, it is possible to argue that state law, ex proprio
vigore, determines the legal consequences that flow from post-statehood
events.
A. The Vegetation Line Issue: Source of Law
We find no escape from the conclusion that Borax and Hughes are
irreconcilable. The mean high tide line of Borax and the vegetation
line of Hughes are 386 feet apart, and so long as the United States
Supreme Court adheres to Borax, the intervening 386 feet belong to
Mrs. Hughes, not to the state of Washington.
One reading of Borax is that the Supreme Court rejected altogether
the principle stated in United States v. Oregon225 that state law may

be a guide to the construction of federal grants. Another reading of
Borax is that the location of the boundary of a federal grant is not
what United States v. Oregon called "an incident to land"; it is the
determinant of the ownership of the land itself. A third reading is that
'United

"=Ibid.

States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 28 (1935).

(Emphasis added.)
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California's neap tide rule is not a "settled and reasonable rule of construction." The third reading is the most difficult, because the Borax
Court expressly refused to consider California statutes and decisions.226 It refused to pass judgment on whether the California rule
was either settled or reasonable. 27
On any reading, Borax and Hughes conflict on the vegetation line
issue. We say this with deference to the brave effort by the Washington Attorney General to distinguish the cases.228 One ground of distinction he advanced is that Borax was merely paying deference to the
views of the court of appeals on California law. The first Wilbur
229
opinion, affirmed in Borax, can be read consistently with that view.
However, if this were the intention of the Supreme Court, the Chief
Justice had unaccountable difficulty in finding appropriate words to
say so. The Court made its view clear that California law was irrelevant.3 °
A second ground of distinction is based on the argument that there
was no issue before the Supreme Court in Borax about the area above
the line of mean high tide (as Borax used the term) and below the
line of vegetation. The Attorney General told the Washington court
that in Borax "the court believed that the 'physical marks' on the
31
ground were below the mean high tide line of the tidelands in issue.
We find no firm basis for any conclusion about what the United
States Supreme Court believed about the location of the vegetation
line or physical marks. The Court did not tell us. However, we would
suppose that if a court holds that line X is the boundary, it must hold
2296 U.S. at 26.
'It
is worthwhile to recall that Justice Brandeis reaffirmed "federal common
law" as the source to resolve interstate disputes in Hinderlider v. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), in an opinion for the Court
delivered the same day as his opinion for the Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). The reason for survival of interstate common law is that the
Supreme Court is given the duty of decision and the law of neither state can be accepted
as conclusive.
State law is a source of federal interstate common law, as it may be a source of
federal law. "Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal,
we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand..." Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S 125, 146-47 (1902).
State law is a primary source, nevertheless, of federal interstate common law.
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
A critical inquiry is why the Borax Court took its common law from English,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey cases, 296 U.S. at 25, and refused to consider
common law decisions of California, id. at 26 n.5.
Opening Brief for Appellant, pp. 69-70.
' See note 83 supra.
2 296 U.S. at 26.
Opening Brief for Appellant, p. 69. The Attorney General cites the summary
of petitioner's brief, 80 L. Ed. at 10, and the Court's comments, 296 U.S. at 22, for
this contention.
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that line Y is not the boundary, regardless of who argued what alternative. There is little ambiguity in what the Supreme Court said on this
subject. The boundary is the line established by the average of all high
tides over the tidal cycle. The Court did not imply a qualification:
"unless the vegetation line is inland from the line of mean high tide."
If, on retrial, the district court had discovered a vegetation line 386
feet above the mean high tide line and issued a decree fixing the boundary at the vegetation line, we think it would have disregarded the
Supreme Court's mandate.
Nevertheless, the Attorney General's argument opens a perplexing
problem, unavoidable in appraising Borax. Whatever the United States
Supreme Court may have thought about the location of the vegetation
line with reference to the line of mean high tide, it was clearly aware
that "neap tide" is below mean high tide. The definition of neap tide
employed by the Court makes this clear. 32
On principles which manifestly it was not the intention of the Suppreme Court to alter, the states are free to establish any boundary
below the high tide line, which marks the limit of what the states may
claim. The Borax opinion expressed this principle when the Court
wrote: "Rights and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the
' 233
sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law.
The Court cited for that statement Barney v. Keokuk which declared: "If they [the states] choose to resign to the riparian proprietor
rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is
not for others to raise objections.34

The government's brief in Samson Johns, relying upon Borax, asserted the principle thus, with its own emphasis: "But while a State
may thus yield rights to riparian owners, it may not take from riparian
owners rights given to them by federal law."2 5
The paradox taxes credibility. The Supreme Court in Borax rejected a neap tide rule of state law, more generous to the government's
patentee than the line of mean high tide which the Court adopted. Yet
in the same decision, it reaffirmed with emphasis the unchallenged
1296 U.S. at 23:
The range of the tide at times of new and full moon "is greater than the
average," as "high water then rises higher and low water falls lower than
usual." The tides at such times are called "spring tides." When the moon is in
its first and third quarters, "the tide does not rise as high nor fall as low as on
the average." At such times the tides are known as "neap tides." "Tidal
Datum Plane," U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Publication No. 135, p. 3.

296 U.S. at 22.

94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877).

Opening Brief for the United States, p. 16. (Emphasis in original.)
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and unchallengeable proposition that the state need not claim for itself
or its grantees land below the high tide line which marks the maximum
of the state's ownership. We can conclude only that the Court did hold
that the line of mean high tide established the boundary, but it did so in
a decision so flawed with error that reexamination is demanded.
What conclusion should the Court reach as a result of that reexamination? Two possibilities consistent with Hughes are conceivable:
(1) Federal law uniformly requires the patentee's tidal boundary to
be at the vegetation line.
(2) Federal law (a) embraces state law in determining a patentee's
boundary, and (b) federal law incorporates the law of a state admitted
subsequent to the federal patent.
We would reject the first possibility out of hand. If a federally
compelled boundary is to be established in disregard of state law, the
Borax line is better than the vegetation line, if for no other reason than
that vegetation is a sometimes thing.
The second alternative involves three hurdles: (1) embracing state
law in federal law with respect to the boundary; (2) doing so nunc pro
tunc in the case of pre-statehood patents like that under which Mrs.
Hughes claimed; and (3) determining that the vegetation line does not
exceed the permissible limits established by a fair and rational federal
law.
1. The FirstHurdle. Factors favoring the incorporation of state law
are persuasive. The major difficulty in establishing a boundary is not
the formulation of a verbal formula, but the application of that formula
to a line on the ground. Borax comes closest to a universally applicable
verbal formula which will work even when there is no vegetation.
Before it could be used, however, a decision would have to be made on
the seiche problem. In addition, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will concern itself with tideland boundary problems to the extent necessary to develop and maintain viable rules. Real property boundaries
demand the maximum of legal certainty. "Certiorari denied" means
merely that the Supreme Court will not decide the controversy today,
but leaves the issues for decision on another day in another case
between other litigants. Nor, since the problems are constitutional,
can they be resolved either by act of Congress or of the state legislatures.
Problems of this type are best resolved by state courts with latitude
to apply state rules. The decision should be influenced by practical
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questions which are not susceptible of uniform answers. What are the
characteristics which realistically distinguish beach from upland? A
uniform federal rule, uninfluenced by conditions in each state, cannot
provide a satisfactory answer. It is bad enough that an answer, flowing
from the Washington Constitution, must be uniformly applied throughout a single state.
There is demonstrably no federal interest which demands a uniform
upland-tideland boundary in fifty states. Borax, given a maximum
application, does not purport to provide any such uniformity. Here
are situations to which Borax does not apply:
a. Mexican or other foreign grants. A preliminary determination in
Borax was whether Mormon Island was part of a Mexican grant. Had
Mormon Island been included in a Mexican grant, California law
would have been applicable.2 36 This is anomalous, but well settled,
and removes much of the California coastline from any compulsion of
Borax.'37 One would suppose that where the boundary was established
by treaty with Mexico, there would be not only one, but two reasons
to treat its location as an exclusively federal question. Since state
courts have freedom to shape the law where the boundary is the subject
of both federal statutes and a treaty, one may well ask what compelling
consideration deprives them of that freedom when only federal statutes
are involved.
b. Non-federal uplands. Borax does not apply at all in the original
states, or in Texas,211 which had no federal public lands, except as the
United States may acquire lands in such states. It does not apply to
school lands, swamp and overflowed lands, or other uplands belonging
to the state.
c. Exceptions in favor of the federally claimed right. States may
yield their claims to upland owners, in whole or in part. Washington
has done so by its judicial rule that the meander line is the boundary if
seaward of the line of ordinary high tide and the patentee's right was
initiated before statehood.23 9
d. Res judicata, estoppel, prescription, statute of limitations. These
doctrines, mostly based on state law, may alter boundaries originally
-1296 U.S. at 15-16.

'See Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 147 P.2d 964,
970-72 (1944) (hearing denied by California Supreme Court).
- See Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167, 192 (1958).
See Narrows Realty Co. v. State, 52 Wn. 2d 843, 329 P.2d 836 (1958), and cases
cited therein.
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established by a Borax rule.24 ° There has been no suggestion that state
laws in these categories are inapplicable to land which has a history of
federal ownership.24 1
e. Non-tidal waters. There is no analogue of Borax applicable to
inland navigable waters.2 4 The same rationale which rejects state law
in determining the line of high tide would reject state law in determining the line of high water on non-tidal rivers and lakes. That no such
rule has been developed on inland waters suggests strongly that none is
needed on tidal waters.
2. The Second Hurdle. The second hurdle is a difficulty present in
the Hughes case not encountered in Borax. The Borax patent followed
" In Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452 (1903), the
Court refused to reopen the issue decided in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court observed, 190 U.S. at 460: "Probably in
most cases the statute of limitations has cured the defects of title which those cases
may have shown."
2 See City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 102 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 644 (1939). Estoppel was based on state law.
See Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 605 (1933), characterizing
Howard v. Ingersoll, discussed in text accompanying note 131 and in note 132 supra,
as a "rule of interpretation." Compare Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606 (1923),
where the Court applied the concept of Howard v. Ingersoll. but only afier careful
consideration of the appropriateness of the interpretation to the Red River, considered in the light of historical context and the physical situation.
Absence of any federal body of law applicable to interior waters is illustrated by
a decision in 1940 by Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Oscar L. Chapman.
State of Washington, 57 Interior Dec. 228 (1940). The Washington Commissioner
of Public Lands appealed from the dismissal, by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, of the state's protest against the federal decision to survey islands in the
Columbia River which were above tide water and claimed by the state.
The General Land Office held that the islands belong to the United States because
they were above "ordinary high water mark" in the year of Washington's admission to the Union. The Washington Commissioner claimed they were under
water at certain times of the year. The Assistant Secretary noted Washington decisions declaring the state's ownership of lands "up to the line of ordinary high
water mark" but he was aware of no state decision that the state owns islands that
"are at certain times of the year under water." Such a state decision would in any
case not be binding on the Department of the Interior since the boundary, according
to Borax, is a federal question.
The Assistant Secretary could find no clear definition of "ordinary high water
mark" in the Washington decisions to resolve this federal question, but he found
two state court decisions from Iowa and one from Oregon. He quoted, id. at 231,
from Pacific Milling & Elevator Co. v. City of Portland, 65 Ore. 349, 133 Pac. 72,
78-79 (1913), which supplied this formula:
The line of ordinary high water is the line to which the water rises in the
seasons of ordinary high water or the line at which the presence of water is
continued for such length of time as to mark upon the soil and vegetation a
distinct character.
The stable character of the islands, their elevation and configuration, and geological structure established that the islands were above "the line of ordinary high
water" at the date of statehood notwithstanding their omission from earlier government surveys. The Assistant Secretary affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, subject to a further showing by the state within sixty days.
He noted, however, citing Borax, that his determination did not preclude the state
or its grpntees fr,-m sowinz in judicial proceedings that the islands were not
public lands of the United States.
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statehood, but the Hughes patent preceded statehood. There was no
state and hence no state law in existence at the date of the Hughes
patent. An able writer has suggested that this is a conclusive objection
to the incorporation of state law, and logically, much can be said for
his view. -43
However, we find nothing repugnant to any eternal verities in the
notion that a federal patent may be construed by reference to future
state law. True, at the date of a pre-statehood patent the future law is
not a "settled and reasonable rule of construction" such as the Court
referred to in United States v. Oregon. Nevertheless, the functional
need for territorial and later state law to fill interstices is as great in
one case as in the other. Federal recognition of changing state law has
244
modern precedent to support it.

3. The Third Hurdle. This brings us to what should be the critical
questions: the nature of the vegetation line rule and the effect of its
application when incorporated in what is necessarily federal law. We
have presented in Part I our reasons for believing that a vegetation
line rule is inherently reasonable because it most closely approximates
the line one would draw if asked to divide the beach from the upland
in terms of the uses to which each is put. Where nature has drawn this
line by vegetation, the burden is heavy on whoever asserts he can do it
better. A line fixed by average high tides of a non-existent waveless
ocean is recommended only by greater universality and perhaps ease of
application. If any choice is left to state courts, the vegetation line
should be a permissible choice.
There is, however, a problem even if we accept the formula stated in
' Resort to the law of a future state to construe a federal patent may be a logical
impossibility, but the United States Supreme Court has done the impossible. In
Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154 (1917), the Court through Mr. Justice Holmes held
that a pre-statehood patent to land adjoining the Kaw River in Kansas did not
convey to the patentee, as against the state, the right to remove sand from the bed
of the river which the Kansas Supreme Court was permitted to find, after statehood,
navigable by the state test rather than by the federal test. The case was distinguished
to the point of extinction in Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260
U.S. 77 (1922), and consigned to uncited oblivion in United States v. Utah, 283
U.S. 64 (1931). The test for navigability for title purposes is now federal.
The course of the federal decisions from Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891),
to Borax is described by Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams,

24 MINN. L. REV. 305, 310-27 (1940). Bade concluded, id. at 317 n.45, that the
dissenting opinion in Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452,
461 (1903), had become the opinion of the Court in Borax with respect to the
determination that the effect of a grant by the United States is a federal question.
Opinions of the Court in Kean, Wkear v. Kansas, supra, and Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S.
508 (1903), were all by Justice Holmes, who concluded in the Kean case that Hardin v.
Jordan, supra, had been relied on too long to be challenged.
Professor Bade's view is unequivocal: "It would seem clear that state law can
have no effect on grants made before statehood." Bade, supra at 317.
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United States v. Oregon as applicable to the location of a boundary.
Is the vegetation line a "settled and reasonable rule of construction" of
a pre-statehood patent when announced by the Washington court in
1966? The objection to Hughes on this ground can be stated as a
quasi-due process objection.
To illustrate the objection, let us assume that the vegetation line of
Mrs. Hughes' property in 1889 was, as it is now, 386 feet above the
mean high tide line as Borax defined the latter term.245 If we assume
that Borax correctly discovered the law, Mrs. Hughes' predecessor was
the owner of a tract of land the moment before statehood with a 386foot east-west dimension. The moment after statehood, the newly created state had become the owner of that tract. This transfer of ownership has the earmarks of a deprivation of property that not even Congress could expressly authorize or compel.246
One answer to this objection is that Borax, rather than Hughes, is
MUnited States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). Even the dissenting justices,
Black and Douglas, conceded in this case, upholding the Federal Assimilative Crimes
Act, that a delegation in which Congress determined the basic policy would be constitutional.
" See sketch in part I A, supra. The mean high tide line of 1889 was not located.
" See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), which raise the issue whether courts make or discover law. For views on
the merits of prospective judicial decisions compare Comment, 77e Prospective
Decision-A Useful "Tool of the Trade," 38 WASH. L, Rav. 584 (1963), with
Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law,
79 HARv.L. REv.56 (1965).

In his opening Hughes brief before the Washington Supreme Court, the Attorney
General cited, at 57-58, the Washington Law Review Comment, supra, for the
following argument:
We are mindful of the court's opinion in Ghione v. State. Nonetheless the
court's opinion there concerned only rivers and streams. Insofar as that opinion
may be deemed a modification of the Eiseiibach doctrine, the opinion should not
be given retroactive effect so as to disturb a rule of property that has been
uniformly applied over a longer period of time to settle important private and
public rights. Prospective overruling of past constitutional doctrine is a useful
judicial tool [citing the Washington Law Review Comment, supra] which has
been conscientiously justified [citing State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v.
Martin, 62 Wn. 2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963)] and traditionally used by
this court in the past. [Citing Miller v. Scarbrough, 108 Wash. 646, 651, 185
Pac. 625 (1919); General Mercantile Co. v. Waters, 127 Wash. 481, 221 Pac.
299 (1923) ; cf. In re McLean, 270 Fed. 348 (W.D. Wash. 1920).]
This argument suggests an interesting application of the prospective decision.
One might suppose that Ghione overruled the "Eisenbach doctrine" in the context of
accretion, retrospective as to rivers and prospective as to tidal waters. As noted in
text accompanying notes 213-14 supra, Ghione preceded both the Commissioner of
Public Lands' survey and the seventy-three superior court decisions which paid it no
heed.
The ghost of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864), may
again take to the judicial playing fields. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 624 (1965), noted that "as early as 1863 [term]
this court drew on the same [Austinian] concept in Gelpcke v. Dubuque ...
(Emphasis added.) When the ghost appears, query which team will succeed in
signing him up first.
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the offender. The federal decision contemporaneous with the Washington constitution is San Francisco v. Le Roy24 7 which stated a vegetation line rule.248 So, a bit more obliquely, did the Washington Supreme
Court in Baer v. Moran Bros. Co.,249 which was affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court.25 ° If a judicial decision can involve unconstitutional retroactivity, Borax is the offender.
To which the response might be that San Francisco v. Le Roy is the
product of Justice Field's notion that vegetation line and neap tide line
are one and the same thing, even though we know that on the Hughes
real estate one is above and the other below the Borax line. Can we
conjecture how Justice Field and his brethren would have resolved the
problem if confronted by the record in Hughes, proving that neap tide
and vegetation lines are in fact hundreds of feet apart?
The answer we prefer eliminates the need for conjecture. There is
abundant basis for justifiable reliance on San Francisco v. Le Roy, the
definition from which was incorporated in official instructions to Bureau
of Land Management Surveyors as late as 1947.251 There is good rea-

son to deny to a state court the power to frustrate that reliance. At the
same time, there should be no objection to a state court's decision
which resolves the internal conflict in the federal precedent in favor of
a vegetation line, neap tide line, or something intermediate.
The Supreme Court of Washington chose the vegetation line. It
should be constitutionally permissible for it to do so. To substitute the
judgment of the United States Supreme Court would be unfortunate
unless that Court is prepared to devote substantial and continuing
attention to what in essence is a local real estate matter.
B. The AccretionIssue: Source of Law
Samson Johns stated the accretion issue and its resolution in these
terms: 252
No question of accretions was involved in Borax, the problem being
the ascertainment of the boundary between the upland and tideland as it
existed at the time the company received its patent. But the principle
there announced is equally applicable where the problem is one of
determining whether imperceptible accretions go with the upland. If the
upland owner is entitled to the imperceptible accretions it is because this
"7138 U.S. 656 (1891).

" See text accompanying note 124 supra.
-2 Wash. 608, 27 Pac. 470 (1891), aff'd, 153 U.S. 287 (1894).
See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 124 supra.
" 1294 F.2d at 832.
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is an attribute of title reserved to or obtained by grant from the Government. Thus the determination of the attributes of an underlying federal
title, quite as much as the determination of the boundaries of the land
reserved or acquired under such title, "involves the ascertainment of the
essential basis of a right asserted under federal law."
If we are correct that federal law should incorporate a state court's

selection of the vegetation line, it should be even clearer that federal
law should incorporate a state court's determination that the boundary
became fixed in location on the date of statehood. We would emphasize "essential" in seeking "the essential basis of a right asserted under

federal law." Obviously not all rights embraced in that bundle of
rights which constitute ownership of real property can be determined
by the federal grant. The legal consequences which flow from events
occurring after the federal grant and after statehood should be for
state law to determine. Determinations of appurtenant water rights
are one example of deference to state law,253 although there is a doctrinal dispute about whence come the rights. 4
The court of appeals erred, we think, in classifying a right to accretions as an "attribute of title" beyond the influence of state law. A
state can determine, we think, that future accretions belong to the
state.2 55 A line fixed against erosion provides at least some element of
compensation for the loss of the expectancy. Compelling considerations of practicality demonstrate the error. If the Samson Johns conclusion is correct, and is applicable to land which the United States has
conveyed, then neither Congress, nor a state legislature can provide a
fixed boundary. Congress lost jurisdiction to do so when the United
States parted with all that it owned; the state legislature never acquired
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
147 (1935).
See Corker, Water Rights and Federalism, 45 CALiF. L. REv. 604, 609 (1957);
Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423,
433-46 (1966).
Oregon statutes claim for the state (a) the beds of all lakes meandered by
United States surveys and (b) accretion or reliction since May 25, 1921. Oms. REv.
STAT. §§ 274.420-.440 (1965). The Supreme Court rejected the first part of the
claim-which in terms declares the lakes navigable and public-in United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1935) :
The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands.
The States are powerless to place any limitation or restriction on that control....
The case is not one of the reasonable construction of grants of the United
States, but the attempted forfeiture to the State by legislative fiat of lands
which, so far as they have not passed to the individual upland proprietors,
remain the property of the United States.
The lakes in question being held non-navigable, validity of the statute insofar as
it related to accretion was not determined; nor was the right in the lake bed of
private persons, not parties to the action between the United States and the state.
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such a power. Although the United States Supreme Court referred to
the right to accretions as vested in County of St. Clair v. Lovingston,
no such frozen rigidity as this can have been intended." 6 The United
States or even a state can physically prevent the occurrence of future
accretions without liability for compensation.25 7 The state can clearly
deny or permit, or permit on terms of its choosing, access to navigable
water.2 The right of access is, as we have seen, a major reason for an
accretion rule.2 ;9
If the United States Supreme Court were ever to decide what the
Samson Johns decision attributes to Borax, the Court would assume an
impossible task. We may loosely refer to the accretion rule, but use of
the definite article is unjustified. What accretion rule? The problems,
variously resolved from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, are large. Their
content is determined by conditions which physically vary from location to location. They vary with the passage of time which makes one
solution appropriate in one century, another solution appropriate in
another.
For example, how rapidly may a water boundary change and still be
an accretion?260 How are accretions apportioned where a water boundary, once straight, is now concave or convex? 261 Does accretion add to
90 U.S. (32 Wall.) 46, 68 (1874):
Whether it is the effect of natural or artificial causes makes no difference.
The result as to the ownership in either case is the same. The riparian right to
future alluvion is a vested right. It is an inherent and essential attribute of the
original property. The title to the increment rests in the law of nature.
The Supreme Court was meeting an argument that federal patents define plats of
ground with fixed limits like Roman agri lintitati. Id. at 53. The Court also
declared that the new states have the same rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction
over shores of navigable waters as the original ones. Id. at 68. The law of nature
presumably extends to both original and new states.
'Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 174, 143 P.2d 1 (1943). In
an opinion by Justice Traynor the California court held that the city's breakwater
which caused gradual washing away of the plaintiff's beach two and a half miles
away, putting plaintiff out of the resort business, created no cause of action. justice
Carter vigorously dissented. But cf. Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198
Pac. 377 (1921) (compensation allowed for erosion caused by public straightening
of river channel).
'Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542, 103 Pac. 833 (1909),
cited with approval in Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.Rt, 255 U.S. 56, 64 (1921).
= See text accompanying note 151 supra.
See Comment, 45 IowA L. REv. 945, 950-52 (1960). This is a cogent and
well-documented criticism of the assumption often made that all rivers conduct
themselves in the same manner. The writer argues persuasively that the law should
take into account the nature of the river. The same reasons dictate taking into account
the divergent natures of ocean shores. See People v. William Kent Estates Co., 51 Cal.
Rep. 215 (1966), discussed in notes 87, 218-20 supra and accompanying text.
I See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 143 (1959). See also Bade, supra note 243, at 327-47.
Professor Bade's useful article demonstrates, but does not say, that state law must
be an important source of whatever law resolves questions of apportionment.
The same problem is involved in apportioning tidelands purchased from the
state described in the conveyance as "All tide lands of the second class, owned by the
'
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the title of the upland owner whose property became riparian only by
the process of erosion when the land is restored in the location which
formerly belonged to someone else?2 2 What happens when a gradually
23
accreting island becomes linked to a gradually accreting mainland? 1
Is there a difference between accretions artificially caused and those
naturally caused? 264 Must the answers be the same in a jurisdiction
which treats the beach as public property and in a jurisdiction which
does not?
These are not questions which are susceptible of uniform answers in
every location in the United States. They are not questions which the
United States Supreme Court can or should be expected to answer.
The major problem of adjudication remains even after such questions
are answered: application of the law to the facts. The state courts are
closer to the facts. They may take judicial notice where the United
States Supreme Court may not. They have time to devote to the task
which the United States Supreme Court does not.
Even if the Supreme Court undertook the impossible, it would perform that function only in states and areas within states where title
derives from the United States. Does nineteenth century history of
federal ownership of the public domain in Washington provide a reason that Washington's real property law should differ from that in
Texas or Massachusetts? Should history impose on some states a dual
law of real property? Washington, no less than Massachusetts, should
have the freedom to establish a consistent body of real property law.
The source of law for resolution of the accretion issue may be disstate of Washington, situate in front of, adjacent to or abutting" lands described by
government survey. Spath v. Larsen, 20 Wn. 2d 500, 148 P.2d 834, 835 (1944).
"2 See Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W. 2d 889 (N.D. 1965), 79 HIARv. L. REv. 442;
Greeman v. Smith, 138 N.W. 2d 433 (N.). 1965). Contrast Yearsley v. Gipple,
104 Neb. 88, 175 N.W. 641, 8 A.L.R. 640 (1919). Cf. Beaver v. United States, 350
F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 937 (1966) (Douglas, J. was of the
opinion that certiorari should be granted).
- Cf. Williams Fishing Co. v. Savidge, 164 Wash. 50, 2 P.2d 722 (1931).
See County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46. 68 (1864)
(no difference) ; Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 147 P.2d
964 (1944) (hearing denied by California Supreme Court) (there is a difference).
In the latter case, California law under which the state owns artificial accretions,
but not natural accretions, was held to be applicable because a Mexican grant was
the origin of plaintiff's title. Query as to the result if the accretion had been to
federally patented upland.
The scholarly opinion of Justice Raymond E. Peters (now of the California
Supreme Court) disposed of the contention that Borax precludes application of the
California rule. Justice Peters characterized Borax as deciding that "where title is
deraigned from the United States ...the question as to the extent of the grant is to
be governed by federal and not by state law." 63 Cal. App. 2d 772. 147 P.2d at
970-72. He assumed, without deciding, that the federal rule was otherwise as to
artificial accretions. Federal cases were clear, however, that "as to patents confirmatory of Mexican grants the state and not the federal law controls." Ibid.
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posed of on an alternative basis not available for disposition of the
vegetation line issue. It may be unnecessary to resort to federal law at
all. Once the land is patented, movement of the boundary after that
date may depend exclusively on state law, and not merely on state law
as a source of federal law. Prior to the effective date of the patent, the
United States has a paramount interest in the property. After the patent, future events which determine whether the boundary moves are
the subject of a paramount state rather than federal interest.
Hughes may be an unwise decision of the accretion issue. However,
the responsibility to decide cases cannot be allocated among state and
federal courts based on whether state courts decide cases wisely and
well. If Hughes is in error, we nevertheless believe it is an error which
the Washington court should be permitted to make.
C. FederalOwnership: Source of Law
for
distinguishing Hughes and Samson Johns is suggested
One basis
in the Hughes opinion. In Samson Johns, the United States was
treated as owner of the upland, whereas in Hughes, the United States
was merely the source of title. Federal ownership, as distinguished
from a federal source of title, might dictate a federal rule as to both
vegetation line and accretion issues, but to no other property.
Clearly, the Samson Johns decision made no such distinction. Samson Johns was based squarely on Borax, where the upland owner
merely derived title under a federal patent. Nevertheless, the possibility of a federal rule applicable only to federally owned property may
prove irresistibly attractive. It offers a solution which makes federal
law applicable where federal ownership makes the federal interest paraamount; it makes state law applicable where the federal interest is
only historic. It avoids the embarrassment of having a state statute
deprive the United States of the right to future accretions to land which
the United States owns. It also avoids the embarrassment arising from
a conclusion that some private property in some states is beyond state
legislative jurisdiction as to future accretions.
The Clearfield doctrine,"' which originated in the discovery that
federal law is applicable to federal checks, provides soil in which Samson Johns might grow if deprived of its roots in Borax. The Clearfield
doctrine is sufficiently amorphous that confident prediction is impossible. -30
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
= See Mishldn, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797
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There are persuasive reasons, however, that a federal rule of real
property boundaries, applicable only when the United States owns real
estate, would be an undesirable solution to the Samson Johns-Hughes
problem. Federal common law which was born in Swift v. T3,so

2 "7

and expired in Erie Railroad26 never applied to real property, and for
very good reasons.
One reason, we think, relates to the necessity of certainty in real
property titles. Federal common law is an eclectic composite of rules
created by federal judges. Its content is uncertain until the Supreme
Court speaks. What is the federal rule? We have seen that the federal
land department in instructing its surveyors takes its instructions in
significant part from state decisions.269 It would add nothing but uncertainty if a federal court were free to reject a Washington decision
applicable to Washington real estate in favor of an Oregon decision
which supplies the ingredients of a federal rule.
Another reason relates to the desirability of making the United
States, like every other land owner, subject to the rule that Blackacre's
boundaries remain unaltered after its conveyance. If Blackacre is
owned by the United States and is conveyed to X, X should have whatever boundaries were applicable to Blackacre before the conveyance.
Otherwise, Y, owner of adjacent Whiteacre, has either an unjustified
windfall or a cause for justifiable complaint, depending on whether the
federal rule provides a more or less generous boundary than the state
rule.
The facts of Samson Johns provide an illustration of why the
United States must enjoy the same boundaries as its conveyees. Had
the United States in that case delayed suit until after 1966 (when the
restrictions in the trust patent expired), the heirs of Samson Johns
would have been identically situated to the Borax Company and to Mrs.
Hughes (except that the patent to her predecessor preceded statehood,
a fact which we have urged should not have a controlling significance).
If federal ownership was the controlling distinction, the Samson
Johns heirs were beneficiaries of a fortuitous decision that prompted
(1957) ; Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1084, 1094-97 (1964).

Cf. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923) (state statute applicable to
determine damages for oil extracted from federal lands); Herron v. Choctaw &
Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1956), discussed note 141 supra.
=41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
-See
text accompanying notes 128 & 134 supra; State of Washington, 57
Interior Dec. 228 (1940), discussed in note 242 supra.
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the United States to quiet its title before the trust restrictions in the
Indian trust patent expired. Had the United States been reluctant to
sue, the heirs could have done little more in their own behalf to stimulate federal action than to say please, or to write their Congressmen
asking them to try to stir up the United States Attorney General. The
fewer legal "rights" which depend for their existence on the exercise of
fortuitous and uncontrollable governmental discretion, the better.
However, the tendencies of federal lawyers to treat federal property
as different are strong. They are strengthened by institutional attitudes ingrained in branches of the federal service. These were exhibited dramatically in a recent controversy between the United States
and the State of Utah over title to land exposed by the receding waters
of Great Salt Lake.
The Salt Lake controversy revolves around competing claims to
what may or may not be reliction land caused by the progressive drying
up of the waters of Great Salt Lake. Most lakes have an inlet and an
outlet and fluctuation of the lake surface is limited to a narrow range
related to the elevation of the outlet. Great Salt Lake is the remnant of
a vast inland sea and has no outlet. While its level has fluctuated
greatly, the long-run trend of the surface is down, hastened in part
because fresh water is intercepted and consumed before it reaches the
lake. Surrounded by salt flats, the lake lacks physically defined banks.
Even a modest decline in water level exposes thousands of acres of
70
additional land.1

Since reliction land belongs to the upland owner, to the Department
of Justice, the exposed land looks like reliction. Forty per cent of the
surrounding land belongs to the United States. The private owners
who hold the other sixty per cent naturally share that view.2 '
The controversy culminated, after several years, in an Act of Congress on June 3, 1966.22 It calls for the establishment of a fixed
'When the Mormon pioneers reached Great Salt Lake in 1847, its surface was
at approximately 4,200 feet, and the water was 35 feet deep. Since 1847, the level
has fluctuated between 4,211.5 feet elevation in 1872 to about 4,194.5 feet in November
1963. Its maximum surface area is 1,570,000 acres, its minimum area 600,000 acres
less. S. RE. No. 1006, to accompany S. 265, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966).
'Hearings
on Salt Lake Meander Line, S. 265, Before the Subcommittee on
Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21, 24 (1965).
7-80 Stat. 192 (1966). The United States is to convey according to §2 by
quitclaim deed "all right, title and interest of the United States in lands including
brines and minerals in solution" lying below the meander line, expressly reserving
to the United States all other minerals, § 3.
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boundary. 7 between state and federal ownerships. A conveyance to
Utah of land below that boundary is to be made on two conditions:
that Utah will convey to the United States its lands above the fixed
boundary;"' that Utah will either pay for what it receives (including
negotiated land exchanges) or litigate over title to the land in con75
troversy
Opposition to the bill came from two sources. After the Interior
Department had come to recognize that a fixed boundary is a practical
necessity in the administration of the federal resource, 27 the United
States Department of Justice opposed it in intemperate terms as an
"outright gift of an unassailable Federal title." Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark cited as the "unassailable" basis of this title the
Samson Johns decision and an Interior Department opinion which
"' Section I of the bill provides:
The Secretary of the Interior shall within six months of the date of the passage
of this Act complete the public land survey around the Great Salt Lake in the
State of Utah by closing the meander line of that Lake, following as accurately
as possible the mean high water mark of the Great Salt Lake used in fixing the
meander line on either side of the unsurveyed area.
The survey of a portion of the lake was in 1883. S. REP. No. 1006, 89th Cong. 2d
Sess. 6 (1966). Under Secretary of the Interior Carver testified that recovery of
the shoreline as it existed at any time prior to a 1934 earthquake would be
difficult. Hearings on Salt Lake Meander Line, S. 265, Before the Subcominnttee
on Public Lands of the Committee on Interiorand Insular Affairs. 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1272 (1965).
' Section 4 provides that conveyance by the state of Utah shall be upon express
authority of an act of its legislature, but no reservation of minerals to the state is
provided.
Section 4 of the act provides that the price paid by Utah is to be "the fair
market value, as determined by the Secretary, of the lands (including any minerals)"
conveyed to the state, and the Secretary may accept "in lieu of money only, interests
in lands, interests in mineral rights, including those beneath the lakebed, the
relinquishment of land selection rights, or any combination thereof equal to the
fair market value."
In § 5, Utah is given nine months either to request the Secretary of the Interior
to determine fair market value, or to maintain an action in the Supreme Court to
secure a determination of the right, title and interest of the lands conveyed to the
state, and the price shall be determined in the latter event after conclusion of the
suit.
Utah is given the right in § 6 to issue permits, licenses, and leases of the lands
as soon as the agreement is made, without waiting until consideration or its manner
of determination has been concluded. If the transaction then falls through, the
United States succeeds to Utah's position with reference to the permits, licenses and
leases.
'"Under Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr. testified, Hearings, supra
note 271, at 126, 127:
Legal precedent based on the common law of riparian rights, as satisfying as it
may be as demonstration in logic, is not helpful to an administrator seeking to
know with exactitude the limits of his responsibilities in a situation like [that
presented by Great Salt Lake.]...
As a practical matter, then, any line which the Congress would decide upon,
based upon the level of the Great Salt Lake at any specific time up to the date
of the enactment of this bill, would give an administrator the line he needs,
but such a line for a date before 1934 could not be as accurately fixed as for a
date since. That is simply because of the earthquake.
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had indicated expressly that the issue is arguable. The opinion quoted
Bureau of Land Management survey instructions which express the
view that the accretion issue is resolved by state law, and the opinion
further took pains to demonstrate that Utah law is in a wobbling
2 77
posture.
The other opposition came from private land owners. While there
was never any effort to legislate away their claim to "reliction" land,
they manifest deep concern about the effect of the legislation as a
precedent.
The statute is a compromise. As enacted it "conveys" to Utah, but
does not "confirm" the state's title as earlier drafts proposed,17 thus
avoiding any implication of congressional construction. For the private
land owners, however, the legislation disclaims an effect on "any valid
existing right or interests, if any. 2 79 "If any" is a thumb in the eye to
the private owners. As enacted, the statute stoutly affirms that the
United States has land to convey, that similarly situated private land
owners may or may not have reliction land, and that Congress doesn't
much care.
The legislation should not affect the issue whether private land
owners have rights in the reliction land. Either they had or they did not
have title to such land prior to June 3, 1966, and neither Congress nor
Deputy Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated the position of the Department
of Justice in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs on June 18, 1965, S. REP. No. 1006, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1966) :
If there were a real doubt as to the location of title to the relicted lands adjoining Great Salt Lake, this bill might be worthy of support as affording a
practical and reasonable resolution of the problem. However, we cannot endorse an attempt at legislated compromise where the position taken by the
Federal Government is clearly correct, and the proposed compromise would
abandon that position and confer some benefit upon the proponents of an
untenable theory.
His major citation, in addition to Samson Johns, is to the Department of the
Interior's decision in State of Utah, 70 Interior Dec. 27 (1963). That decision is
accompanied by an extensive analysis of the problem by the Director of the Bureau
of Land Management dated 1961, 70 Interior Dec. at 31, which it affirms.
The "untenable theory" supporting Utah's claim to reliction land was sound
doctrine in 1917 when the First Assistant Secretary of the Interior instructed the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, 46 L.D. 68, 69 (1917) :
It must be held, therefore, that the ownership of all lands covered by the
waters of [navigable] Owens Lake at the date of the admission of California into
the Union was in the State of California, and that such of them as have been
uncovered since that date are not in any sense public lands of the United
States, and can neither be legally surveyed nor disposed of by the Federal
Government, and that they did not, therefore, pass to the State under the swampland grant of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat. 519), and can not be patented to the
state as such.
z"80 Stat. 192 §2 (1966). See 112 CONG. REc. 4794 (daily ed. March 4, 1966);
112 CoNG. REc. 7139 (daily ed. April 4, 1966); 112 CoNG. REc. 10560 (daily ed.
'May 19, 1966), for earlier proposed drafts and discussion of them.
80 Stat. 192 § 2 (1966).
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the state legislature could deprive them of title without compensation.
Congress did not purport to do so. Nevertheless, statutes are a source
of law, and of policy which shapes law, broader than the jurisdiction of
the enacting legislature. A legislative recognition by both Congress and
the State of Utah that a fixed boundary is a practical necessity is not
helpful to the private claim to either present or future reliction. When
the reliction claims of the private land owners reach the Supreme
Court, if they are that fortunate, the history of the controversy
furnishes a basis to predict that their case will be argued by their own
counsel, not by the Solicitor General. The institutional zeal of the
Department of Justice is stirred when federal ownership, not mere
federal source of title is involved.
This prediction requires hedging. On October 10, 1966, just before
this manuscript was released to the printer, the Supreme Court invited
the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the view of the United
States in the Hughes case.280 This request, prior to action on Mrs.
Hughes' petition for certiorari, is significant. In Borax, no appearance
for the United States was ever made.
The Solicitor General's brief, whatever he says, is likely to be a
state document of importance. He is called upon to resolve initially a
not unaccustomed dilemma, to decide to what extent he responds as
the lawyer for a client who owns a lot of upland real estate, and to
what extent as lawyer for a government with a troublesome problem in
federalism.
In the former role, his choice is clear. Because it is hard to distinguish from Samson Johns, Hughes is not a helpful decision in maximizing the real estate ownership of the United States. He should ask
that Hughes be reversed.
In the latter role, his choice is less clear. The United States government has small concern with either the accretion rule or the vegetation
line rule where it has long ago parted with its entire interest in the
upland. However, to permit Borax to be overruled or forgotten
without a struggle might be a breach of duty to the client who owns
real estate. It is the best case that client has, and to find a Clearfield
rock on which Samson Johns may sit after Borax has been washed
away is at best a chancy thing. Furthermore, it is not a matter which
can be effectively argued in Hughes, where present federal ownership
is not involved.
'85

Sup. Ct. 82 (1966).
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Perhaps the Solicitor General can persuade himself that the Borax
mean high tide rule and the accretion rule are so superior to the alternatives that the interests of the United States as an upland owner and
the interests of everyone else are identical. If so, he may find that
there is no conflict between his roles.
Whatever may be the appropriate view of the merits, it is hard to
justify denial of certiorari. Denial would simply mean the continuation of an uncertainty which no one but the United States Supreme
Court can resolve. Its most recent effort, in Borax in 1935, did not do
the job.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Our conclusion can be summarized in a sentence: There are no easy
answers.
The paradox of Hughes is that the aspect of the decision easiest to
defend on the merits, the vegetation line issue, is hardest to defend on
the jurisdictional question. Federal law necessarily determines a federal patentee's boundary; the jurisdictional issue is how far that
federal law may incorporate state law which determines that the tideland boundary is the vegetation line. The aspect of the decision the
most difficult to defend on the merits, the accretion issue, is easiest to
defend on the jurisdictional question. The decision determines that
the boundary is fixed by the vegetation line as it existed in 1889, a
fact unascertainable and not very relevant to 1966 conditions, even if
ascertainable. However, state law, wise or unwise, should determine
the legal consequences that flow from events which happen after the
United States has parted with all it owns.
The hardest questions of all, however, are those which Hughes
leaves with the legislature. Most of them will remain whether Hughes
is affirmed, reversed or left in limbo by the United States Supreme
Court.
First, what is the legislature's power? The decision on both vegetation line and accretion issues is a construction of the state constitution.
The legislature cannot amend the state constitution, even though
Hughes is based, in part, on acceptance of a construction of the constitution which the court attributed to the legislature. Furthermore,
even the people cannot amend the constitution retroactively to deprive
any person of property without due process of law, and purchasers
of tideland surely have a constitutionally vested property right.
However, the decision as to where the beach begins should be made
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legislatively. Ultimate answers rest on policy determinations which
a court is not well-equipped to make. Facts on a record, supplemented
to the extent judicial notice permits, do not provide an adequately
informed answer, because those facts are largely confined to one piece
uf property in a particular location.
The legislature should be permitted to yield rights which the Hughes
decision confers on the state, and nothing in article XVII section 1 of
the constitution provides to the contrary. That section did not make
tideland inalienable by the state. Conversely, the state can acquire
rights for any public purpose upon payment of compensation. Where
die beach has eroded, the tideland which Hughes gives to the upland
owner can be acquired from any private person by purchase or condemnation. The legislature has power, in short, to do whatever in its
judgment is necessary to protect and develop the beach as a public
resource. Hughes affects only the cost, and hence perhaps the likelihood, of the state's doing so. 28'
What should the legislature do? This provocative sentence concludes the Hughes opinion: "All accretion subsequent to November 11, 1889 is owned by the state and may be sold or reserved as
a public highway or public recreation area as the legislature shall
determine."2 2 We would hope that the legislature would reach a
different judgment from that of its predecessors which disposed of
tidelands. The importance of the beach as a public resource is hard
to overstate. Hughes has served a desirable purpose in focusing attention on the problem.
If Hughes finally determines the issues for the State of Washington,
it need not conclude even the issue of compensability. Mrs. Hughes
and other upland owners were entitled to rely on Ghione. It is true
that Ghione involved rivers and not the ocean, that what the court
said about the ocean is dictum if a distinction between river and ocean
can be found. Such a distinction would be hard to articulate, however,
in an opinion which takes its vegetation line rule applicable to the
ocean from Lake Pend Oreille in Idaho, and recognizes that reliance
on real property boundaries requires that they be based on a rule of
property.
"IWhether for recreation or some other purpose, usefulness of the beach usually
requires the acquisition of some upland. California acquisitions of land above the
high tideline total about 165 miles out of approximately 1,500 miles of shoreline.
Acquisitions of about 22,254 acres have cost $50,000,000. Letter of April 21, 1966 to
the author from W. F. Grader, Deputy Administrator of Resources Agency of
California.
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 29.
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Compensability based upon reliance on something less than constitutional dogma has precedent. We would call attention to a great
decision by the United State Supreme Court dealing with another
problem of costs and compensability: United States v. Gerlach Live
Stock Co.25 3 In that case, the United States Department of Justice
contended that the United States could acquire water rights for California's Central Valley Project without paying for them. The federal
navigational servitude, they contended, makes navigable water a federal
resource, which in effect already belongs to the government.
The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue, holding that
Congress had not authorized the taking of water rights, compensable
or not, without paying for them. Although the project was rendered
more costly in dollars, Gerlach was a good decision because it probably
read with accuracy the intent of Congress. It was a fortunate decision
because it did not impose the cost of water rights on those who would
have continued to enjoy them but for the project. It helped gain for
the project the approval and satisfaction important to the success of
any public undertaking, large or small.
The costs of conserving and utilizing the beach for the public
benefit should be public costs. Constitutional concepts of what is
property determine what the public must pay, but they do not necessarily determine the limits of what the public should pay.
We are not prepared to offer an opinion on what the public costs
of developing the beach should include, even as limited to the Long
Beach Peninsula. One relevant inquiry concerns the use to which the
state puts the land in controversy, which the court decided belongs to
the state. Preservation in its natural state, sale to commercial developers, or placing privies for the use of the public are all alternatives
which Hughes offers to the state. The choice among them may provoke
different degrees of enthusiasm among upland owners and local residents.2 8 4
Another relevant inquiry relates to the antecedents of Hughes, which
- 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
"The problem resolved by the courts is necessarily a problem of boundary.
As resolved by legislation, a more imaginative decision is possible which may
recognize that boundary is of secondary importance. The Submerged Lands Act of
1953, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1962), provided new boundaries for
the states, but the problem calling for resolution was state versus federal rights to
revenues from oil, which lies in subterranean pools not responsive to boundaryfixing decrees.

The pragmatic issue in Hughes and its aftermath is the disposition of 561 feet of
what may or may not be beach. The upland owner's strongest equity is to compensation for anything which the state does to deprive that 561 feet of its status as
open beach.
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we cannot fully appraise. That decision appears to be primarily a
ratification of a decision by the Commissioner of Public Lands, applied
without much examination by the superior courts. The decision was
made in disregard of the law earlier declared by the Washington
Supreme Court. The process of its making had the lowest degree of
public visibility until it emerged in 1966 as a rule which the Washington Constitution makes applicable to tidelands, and possibly to inland
shore lands, throughout the state. We have listened to contradictory
assertions about justifiability of the reliance on the Long Beach Peninsula where the facts were better known prior to 1966 than elsewhere
in the state. Even a consensus on the Long Beach Peninsula that the
Commissioner was more than generous to Mrs. Hughes and her neighbors would leave the Hughes decision a source of surprise to those in
other parts of the state who may have relied on Ghione.
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953215 compensated coastal states
for their reliance on what turned out to be a mistaken view of Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan.2 6 That act was passed after wrenching travail in
2 87 which set new
the aftermath of United States v. California,
seaward
limits to the states' tidelands. To some, the submerged lands act is a
giveaway; to others it remains as only partial restitution in the interests of justice.
On a smaller scale, Hughes v. State presents Washington with a
similar problem.288 Fact and opinion, jurisprudence and politics, are
inextricably entwined in any answer to the question where the beach
begins. The responsibility passed to the legislature and the people
is more difficult than the Washington Supreme Court's decision.
Although the United States Supreme Court may alter the nature of
the legislature's problem, the beach will remain. With it will remain
a responsibility, primarily in the state, for the wise handling of the
upland owners' defeated expectations and for the wise use of a priceless resource.
-67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1962).
'44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
'We would leave no implication that the legislative solution to these problems
adopted by Congress was necessarily a good model. The controversy related to
oil. The solution was in providing new boundaries, although oil pools do not locate
themselves in response to lawyers' boundaries. It might have been better to deal
with oil revenues. An odd result of the statute is that somewhere beyond each
state's seaward boundary there lies a federal area in which the law, for many

purposes, is the fossilized version of the adjoining state's law as of August 7, 1953.
66 Stat. 462 § 4(2) (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (1964). See Christopher, The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier,6 STAN. L. REv. 23, 37-43
(1953). The state statutes extant in 1953 are unrepealable by the state legislatures
that produced them.
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ADDENDUM
"MEMORANDUmi FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AmIcus CuRIAE"

The Solicitor General responded to the Supreme Court's invitation
of October 10 on November 14, 1966, with an eleven-page memorandum bearing the caption we have quoted. It is, as we predicted in type
already set, a document of significance. It also contains reason for
astonishment.
The Hughes decision by the Washington Supreme Court is characterized as having "held that federal law is inapplicable and that under
the law of Washington the seaward boundary of ocean front property,
at least when not owned by the United States, is fixed by the line of
high tide on November 11, 1889-the date on which Washington was
' 289
admitted to statehood.
Immediately following that characterization, the Memorandum
recites:- Of,

For petitioner, the practical consequence of the decision below is that
the ocean front property which her predecessor in title obtained from
the United States is now held to be some 560 feet inland. In the view of
the United States, the case presents an important question of federal law,
involving a source of serious friction in federal-state relations, which
merits review by this Court.
Reason for astonishment is that the Solicitor General directs his
analysis and argument exclusively to the accretion issue. The vegetation-line issue, which accounts for 386 feet of the 561 feet in controversy, is neither discussed nor recognized in the Memorandum except
as it is implicit in the reference just quoted to "some 560 feet." We
can only conjecture whether the Solicitor General failed to understand
that the vegetation line issue was the major issue decided in Hughes,
or intended to acquiesce so far as the Government is concerned in the
state court's determination of that issue without saying so.
The memorandum directed to the accretion issue suggests reversal
of Hughes based primarily on the Borax and Samson Johns decisions.
The primary federal interest appears to be the interest of the United
States as a real estate owner. The court is informed that Interior
Department records (judicially noticeable?) "reveal that public and
-) Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 2, filed pursuant to
invitation in Hughes v. Washington, 87 Sup. Ct. 82(1966).
2 Id. at 2.
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acquired lands of the United States stretch along approximately 215
miles of the Washington coast (including Puget Sound and off-shore
'
islands)," 291
and include holdings in custody of the Bureau of Sport

Fisheries and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. Further, "[a]n additional 72 miles of coastline are
presently being acquired for the National Park Service. As to acquired
land, the United States presumably obtains no greater rights than
' 292

those enjoyed by its grantors. 1

The Solicitor General reads Hughes as holding that "in Washington,
the United States lacks the power to convey property bounded by the
line of mean high tide as that line may be gradually modified by
natural forces."'2 9 He asserts that "the precise question considered
by the courts below and presented by the petition [for certiorari] here
is whether the physical limits of property conveyed under a federal
29 4
patent can be altered by State law.)
The Solicitor General answers the issues as he thus frames them.
The Supreme Court has already created a well developed body of
principles, constituting federal common law, which resolve the controversy. A federal patent conveys "a vested right to an ambulatory
seaward boundary" and the Washington Court "has purported to deny
petitioner an attribute of title which the United States intended to
convey." Finally, "the State's claim, insofar as it rests on an assertion
of its sovereign title to tidelands, derives from and is measured by
federal common law. This is so because its title to tidelands is based
on its constitutional right to stand on an equal footing with other
29
States."
The Solicitor General does not deal with the extent to which the
United States Supreme Court decisions creating federal common law
purported to apply principles of state law, which the states are free
to determine for themselves, nor the implications of a federally
enshrined federal common law which may be unreachable by any
legislative body.
The Solicitor General misstates the issue, we think, when he
describes Hughes as deciding that the United States lacked power
to prescribe the accretion rule which would apply to land it has
" Id. at 3 n.1. (Emphasis added.)
2 2Ibid.
21Id. at 3.
4
" Id. at 6.

-'Id. at 9.
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conveyed until the end of time. The answer to that issue certainly
favors the United States. The question which requires answer, however, relates to when, how, and whether the United States exercised
that power.
Two brand new messages in the Memorandum may have far reaching significance:
(1) The equal footing argument, coupled with expression of concern
about the boundaries of lands which the United States is acquiring in
the State of Washington, identifies the federal contention as one which
might be as applicable to Texas as to Washington.
(2) A footnote2 9" indicates that in future litigation the United
states as party litigant-and neither the State of Washington nor
persons similarly situated to Mrs. Hughes-may be the big winner:
It should be noted that the patent itself does not appear to have been
put in evidence below. We assume, as the courts below assumed, that
the patent in some appropriate way described a tract bounded on its
seaward side by the line of high tide. We also assume that, between the
time of the survey in which the tract was laid out and the time of the
patentee's entry, there had not been such substantial accretion as to put
the patentee on notice of the government's mistake in conveying a tract
inequitably larger than those conveyed to other patentees where similar
tracts were intended. See Madison v. Bacsart, 59 I.D. 415.
The Solicitor General's footnote must be read with reference to
Under Secretary Chapman's decision in Basart in 1947, which stated
a "well-established" exception to the rule that the water line and not
a meander line is an upland patentee's boundary: "... if, at the time
a homestead entry is made, a large body of land previously formed by
accretion existed between the meander line and the waters of the
stream, then the meander line will be treated as the boundary line of
the grant, and the patent will be construed to convey only the lands
2
within that meander line.

97

The Washington court's sketch shows all of Mrs. Hughes' land to
consist of accretion formed since 1859. How the Basart doctrine may
be applicable to her real estate, if at all, is unclear. However, the
Solicitor General's footnote serves no conceivable purpose other than
to stake out a claim, on some state of facts, that neither Mrs. Hughes
" Id. at 9 n.6
'59 Interior Dec. 415, 421-22 (1947).
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nor the State of Washington, but rather the Government of the United
States, is the owner of the accretion land in dispute.
A firm prediction is that the Hughes litigation will ultimately terminate either in favor of Mrs. Hughes or of the State of Washington. The
winner is now on notice that its claim is subject to one which may be
asserted by the United States, which asks the Supreme Court to
remember the Basartdoctrine.
Basart is not particularly impressive, either as doctrine or as authority. Its adoption by the Solicitor General, however, is both impressive
and portentous. The Solicitor General's Memorandum declares that a
movable boundary is a fundamental and constitutionally protected right
of a patentee from the United States, but weakens that position by a
gratuitous footnote which adds, in effect: unless the United States is
the owner of intervening accretion land.
The footnote assertion of a federal claim of ownership of accretion
land, equivocal as it is, could be the first shot in a major legal war. If
so, the firing of the shot rather than the modest caliber of the weapon
employed, is the fact of major significance.

